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Recent case law has brought the common law contractual penalty doctrine under 
scrutiny and has created uncertainty. Traditionally, the penalty doctrine has only 
ever applied in situations where there has been a breach of contract. The Australian 
High Court reformulated the penalty doctrine in Andrews v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd. This reformulation extended the application of the 
penalty doctrine to instances other than breach of contract. As the penalty doctrine 
is found in almost all common law countries, this decision has not gone unnoticed 
and has received heavy criticism.  
 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court, in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi, 
commented on the decision of Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd and disapproved of the reformulation, given the many problems 
associated with extending the doctrine. These problems include infringing upon the 
freedom of contract as well as requiring the judiciary to review the substantive 
fairness of parties’ agreements. This is not the role of the courts. The courts role is 
supervisory only. Despite these substantial criticisms, the Australian High Court 
proceeded to confirm the decision in Andrews in Paciocco v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Limited. In this more recent High Court decision, French 
CJ suggested statutory reform as the appropriate way forward. 
 
This paper argues that in light of the historical formulations of the penalty doctrine, 
the High Court in Andrews was not justified in stating that the doctrine had always 
applied in instances other than breach of contract. Further, the High Court should 
have explained their reasons for extending the penalty doctrine when the principles 
of contractual construction had not changed for over a century. This paper also 
analyses the different conclusions reached in the Supreme Court decision in the 
United Kingdom, where the traditional application of the doctrine was upheld. 
Given the shared jurisdictional history with respect to the penalty doctrine, the 
different findings are perplexing. Proposed reforms to the doctrine, in light of 
French CJ’s comment, are also considered and evaluated. This paper concludes 
that consideration of the parties’ bargaining positions when deciding if a payment 
is a penalty is a relevant factor in other jurisdictions and a beneficial reform that 
should be adopted by the Australia courts. 
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The penalty doctrine (the Doctrine) is a principle of contract law which has existed 
for centuries. The Doctrine applies in situations where a secondary obligation such 
as the payment of a sum of money falls due when a person breaches a primary 
obligation in the contract. If that sum of money is extravagant and out of all 
proportion to the loss suffered by the non-breaching party as a result of that breach, 
that sum constitutes a penalty and is unenforceable because of the Doctrine.  
 
The Doctrine received recent scrutinisation by the Australian High Court in 
Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.1 Part of this scrutiny 
involved the High Court making an historical analysis of the Doctrine and its 
developments. The High Court concluded that, as equity had always looked to 
substance over form, the Doctrine had always applied to sums that fell due on an 
event not occasioning breach of contract. The High Court’s decision thereby 
extended the scope of the Doctrine to apply in instances other than breach of 
contract. Prior to the decision in Andrews, the Doctrine had only ever applied to 
situations of breach of contract. As the High Court gave no reason for modifying 
the Doctrine, this decision confused the legal community and was criticised by 
commentators.  
 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court decision of Cavendish Square Holding BV v 
Makdessi2  was handed down following the decision of Andrews. The Court in 
Cavendish discussed the extended application of the Doctrine in Andrews and 
criticised it. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Australian High Court’s 
historical analysis in Andrews and refused to extend the Doctrine’s application.  
 
The Australian High Court then considered the decision of Andrews and the 
decision of Cavendish in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited.3 The High Court confirmed the decision in Andrews and confirmed the 
extended application of the Doctrine despite the criticism that Andrews had received 
by the Court in Cavendish and by commentators in Australia. French CJ stated that 
                                                          
1 (2012) 247 CLR 205 (‘Andrews’). 
2 [2015] UKSC 67 (‘Cavendish’). 
3 (2016) 333 ALR 569 (‘Paciocco’). 
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a ‘difference has emerged since the decision in Andrews between the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom and this Court in relation to the scope of the law 
relating to penalties’.4 However, as Australia and the United Kingdom are separate 
jurisdictions, the High Court held that Australian law does not need to follow the 
law of the United Kingdom. French CJ noted with respect to the Doctrine, that 
‘more than one account of its construction and more than one view of whether it 
should be abrogated or extended or subsumed by legislative reform is reasonably 
open’.5 French CJ concluded that perhaps in Australia ‘statutory law reform offers 
more promise than debates about the true reading of English legal history’.6 
 
The law involving contractual penalties has been an area of flux ever since. In order 
to evaluate the historically based decision of Andrews, an historical overview of the 
Doctrine and its developments are required. This is provided in Chapter II and 
Chapter III of this thesis. This will determine whether the High Court in Andrews 
was justified in determining that the Doctrine has always applied in instances other 
than breach of contract.  
 
Chapter IV discusses the facts in Andrews and analyses the case from first instance 
through to the High Court decision, in light of the historical analysis undertaken in 
Chapters II-III. This is necessary in order to evaluate whether or not the decision in 
Andrews was justified. 
 
Chapter V evaluates the decision of Cavendish in order to understand why the 
United Kingdom refused to follow the decision of Andrews and extend the scope of 
the Doctrine. This is relevant given the United Kingdom and Australia share a 
jurisdictional history with respect to the Doctrine. 
 
Chapter VI analyses the High Court decision of Paciocco in order to better 
understand the effect of the change to the law brought about by the decision of 
Andrews. The reasons why the High Court affirmed the decision of Andrews and 
any comments on the United Kingdom decision in Cavendish is also relevant.  
                                                          
4 Ibid 573 [6]. 




In light of French CJ’s comments, Chapter VII evaluates each reform to the 
Doctrine that has been proposed over the years and concludes as to which reforms, 


































II HISTORY OF THE PENALTY DOCTRINE 
A 13th Century – 16th Century  
Penalty clauses have been traced back to the 13th century in England.7 During the 
13th century, the common law courts held penalties to be lawful. Penalties were 
contained within defeasible bonds.8 Defeasible bonds were promises under seal to 
pay a quantified sum of money which ceased to have effect on the satisfaction of a 
condition.9 The condition usually required performance of a primary obligation. 
The party who held the bond was able to bring their action in debt making it 
unnecessary for them to prove their loss. This made it possible to specify an amount 
much greater than their loss. From the late 16th century equity started to relieve 
against full enforcement of a penalty in a bond in instances where it would be unjust 
to do so.10 Examples include where the obligor failed to meet the condition on time 
due to mistake, accident or extremity, or when payment was made but the bond was 
not cancelled.11  
 
B 17th Century  
In the 17th century, equity started to refund the difference between the penalty that 
was paid and the true damage caused by the breach, together with interest and 
costs.12 The common law courts then amended their procedures regarding actions 
pleaded in assumpsit with respect to money bonds.13 As Lord Nottingham stated, 
the common law courts ‘changed their rules… when they saw that equity would 
                                                          
7 See Joseph Biancalana, ‘Contractual Penalties in the King’s Court 1260–1360’ (2005) 64 
Cambridge Law Journal 212; William Newland, ‘Equitable Relief Against Penalties’ (2011) 85 
Australian Law Journal 434, 439 citing David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of 
Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1999) 30. 
8 Also known as conditioned bonds. C J Rossiter, Penalties and Forfeiture: Judicial Review of 
Contractual Penalties and Relief Against Forfeiture of Proprietary Interests (Law Book, 1992) 1-
2; Joseph Biancalana, ‘The Development of the Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance’ (2005) 
26 Journal of Legal History 103, 103. 
9 Biancalana, ‘The Development of the Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance’, above n 8, 103; 
Newland, above n 7, 439 citing Henry James Holthouse, A New Law Dictionary (Charles C Little & 
James Brown, 2nd ed, 1850) 53-54; Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 
November 2015) [4].  
10 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 617. 
11 Ibid citing W H Loyd, ‘Penalties and Forfeitures’ (1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 117, 124-125; 
A W B Simpson, ‘The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance’ (1966) 82 Law Quarterly Review 
392, 416-417. 
12 Friend v Burgh (1679) Rep TF 437 cited in Simpson, above n 11, 417-418; Andrews v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 617. 
13 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 229-230 [53]. 
See also AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 189. 
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relieve, [and] have chosen rather to relieve the parties themselves’.14 The common 
law courts refusal to enforce penalties led to the rise in principle that a penalty 
clause was unenforceable.15 These changes provided procedural ease and 
‘avoid[ed] the delay and wasted costs associated with obtaining a judgment at law 
on the bond and then an injunction from the Chancellor’.16 This position was then 
regulated at common law17 with the Statute of William III in 1696,18 regarding non-
performance of agreements or covenants and consequently suing upon the penalty, 
and the Statute of Anne in 170519 with respect to money bonds.20  
 
A principle emerged during the 17th century where relief against the penalty would 
not be granted if compensation was unavailable or could not be ascertained.21 A 
primary example includes Tall v Ryland22 where a bond was entered into for £20 
                                                          
14 D E C Yale (ed), Lord Nottingham’s ‘Manual of Chancery Practice’ and ‘Prolegomena of 
Chancery and Equity’ (Cambridge University Press, 1965) quoted in Andrews v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 229-230 [53]; Austin v United Dominions 
Corporation Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 612, 625-626. Blackstone also commented on these procedural 
changes, stating that the common law courts were induced ‘to adopt (where facts can be clearly 
ascertained) the same principles of redress as have prevailed in our courts of equity’: Sir William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) vol 4, 435. See 
also Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 230 [54]; 
Simpson, above n 11, 419.  
15 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 189. 
16 Rossiter, above n 8, 11.  
17 See Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 229-230 
[53]. 
18 Statute 8 & 9 Wm III c 11 s 8 (1696) (The Administration of Justice Act 1696). Bonds within the 
Statute of William III were for the non-performance of several covenants and permitted damages to 
be assessed once breaches were proved. Execution was restrained once damages, interest and costs 
were paid: Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 230 
[54]. See also Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 617 
[12]. However, judgment remained as security in case of further breach: Andrews v Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 230 [54] citing E P Hewitt and J B 
Richardson, White and Tudor’s Leading Cases in Equity (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 9th ed, 1928) vol 
2, 224. See also AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 202 (Deane J). 
19 Statute 4 & 5 Anne c 3 ss 12, 13 (1705) (The Administration of Justice Act 1705). A common 
money bond fell within the Statute of Anne because ‘only one breach can be assigned, and the penal 
sum is not for the non-performance of several covenants’: Preston v Dania (1872-73) LR 8 Ex 19 
(B Bramwell) quoted in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 
611, 619. Payment of the assessed loss plus interest would act as though the condition had been met: 
Rossiter, above n 8, 12.  If paid into court together with costs, this would satisfy the damage in full 
and result in the discharge of the bond: Rossiter, above n 8, 12; Andrews v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 230 [54]. 
20 See Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 229-230 
[53]; AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 189. A bond fell within the scope of 
the Statute of Anne or the Statute of William III, but not both: Smith v Bond (1833) 10 Bing 125, 132 
citing Murray v Earl of Stair (1823) 2 B & C 82, 317-318 (Holroyd J): cited in Andrews v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 619.  
21 See Tall v Ryland (1670) 1 Chan Cas 183; 22 ER 753 cited in AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin 
(1986) 162 CLR 170, 187. 
22 (1670) 1 Chan Cas 183; 22 ER 753. 
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conditioned upon the plaintiff not disparaging the defendant’s goods.23 However, 
the plaintiff breached the condition24 and applied for equitable relief against the 
penalty, alleging that the damage was ‘not considerable nor valuable’.25 However, 
it was for this reason that equitable relief was denied:26  
[T]he bond was not conditioned for Payment of Money or Performance of 
Covenants, or for any Matter for which Damages in an Action of Debt, Covenant or 
any other Action, was recoverable; nor was there any-Way to measure the Damages 
but by the Penalty.27  
Equity would not relieve against a bond of which compensation was not available.28 
 
C 18th Century  
A number of important cases29 relevant to the development of the Doctrine occurred 
during the 18th century. In Peachy v Duke of Somerset,30 the Lord Chancellor stated: 
‘the true ground of relief against penalties is from the original intent of the case, 
where the penalty is designed only to secure money, and the Court gives him all 
that he expected or desired.’31 The Lord Chancellor held32 that a court will relieve 
against forfeitures when the loss or damage has been completely compensated:33 
                                                          
23 The parties were fishmongers with adjacent shops; Ibid 183; 753. 
24 Tall v Ryland (1670) 1 Chan Cas 183, 183; 22 ER 753, 753. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 184; 753. 
28 Ibid 183; 753.   
29 See, eg, Hardy v Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26 where the plaintiff sold the lease and good-will of the 
shop to the defendant for £300. The plaintiff entered into a bond to the defendant in the amount of 
£600. This bond contained the condition that for 19 years, the plaintiff should not sell brandy in 
quantities less than 6 gallons within 5 miles of London and Westminster; or else the bond would 
become void. The plaintiff breached the condition and brought an action in equity, requesting the 
court to determine the actual damage sustained and restrain Martin by injunction on payment of 
these damages. Lord Loughborough held that ‘the penalty is never considered… as the price for 
doing what a man has expressly agreed not to do. The court will restrain him from setting up a trade 
in opposition to his own agreement, although he has paid the penalty’. He held the court will 
moderate the damages sought to the real damage sustained in a case such as this, which involved an 
agreement not to sell brandy with a penalty for selling it. An injunction was granted to restrain the 
defendant from executing the penalty, with quantum damnificatus to be determined: See Hardy v 
Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26, 26-27. 
30 (1720) 1 Strange 447; 93 ER 626. The plaintiff made leases contrary to the custom of the manor 
and without a licence from the lord. The leases gave the leaseholders rights to fell timber and dig 
stones. The question before the court was whether such leases constituted a forfeiture at law and 
whether equity would provide relief: Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 447; 93 ER 
626, 626-627. 
31 Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 453; 93 ER 626, 630. 
32 The Lord Chancellor further stated that ‘forfeitures are intended only to secure the lord’s rents 
and services, and therefore [it’s] very proper for a Court of Equity to interpose and prevent his having 
more than that security’: Ibid 449; 628. 
33 The forfeiture was by way of security only and so relief against forfeiture was granted upon 
payment of compensation. 
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‘As of a fine or rent, for there, upon payment of what is due, with interest, equity 
will relieve’.34 This case demonstrates the engrained procedure of awarding 
damages plus interest and costs.35  This case further refined the principle that equity 
requires the damage to be compensable, otherwise no “handle” exists in which for 
equity to intervene: ‘for it is the recompense that gives this Court a handle to grant 
relief’.36   
 
In Sloman v Walter37 the court held38 that ‘[w]here the penalty of a bond is only to 
secure the enjoyment of a collateral object, equity will grant an injunction against 
a suit for the recovery, and an issue quantum damnificatus,39 to try the real 
damage’.40 Parks v Wilson41 further provided if the condition required conveyance 
of an interest or estate in land, equity may treat the condition as evidence of an 
agreement to convey.42 Specific performance may be ordered as payment of the 
bond was considered inadequate compensation.43 This demonstrates the promissory 
nature of the bond and that non-performance of a condition was characterised as a 
breach of contract; only when damages are inadequate compensation for breach of 
contract, will specific performance be awarded. During the late 18th century courts 
started to show ‘restlessness with their longstanding duty to relieve against penalties 
[which] has been attributed to… the principle of freedom of contract reach[ing] its 
zenith’.44 
 
                                                          
34 Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 447; 93 ER 626, 626. The Lord Chancellor held 
that this was agreeable to relief against penal bonds in which the court would not allow the parties 
to ‘take any other advantage of the forfeitures, than what is necessary to satisfy the original intent 
of the agreement’: Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 449; 93 ER 626, 628.  
35 In this case, that included the tenant accepting a licence or paying the relevant fine: Ibid 449; 628. 
36 Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 453; 93 ER 626, 630 (Lord Macclesfield). See 
also Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 225-226 [40]. 
37 (1783) 1 Bro CC 418 (‘Sloman’). 
38 The Lord Chancellor also stated that ‘where a penalty is inserted merely to secure the enjoyment 
of a collateral object, the enjoyment of the object is considered as the principal intent of the deed, 
and the penalty only as accessional, and, therefore, only to secure the damage really incurred’: Ibid 
419. 
39 An issue directed by a court of equity to be tried in a court of law, to ascertain before a jury the 
amount of damages suffered by the non-performance or breach of contract. The court will grant 
relief upon payment of damages once ascertained. 
40 Sloman v Walter (1783) 1 Bro CC 418, 418. 
41 (1723) 10 Mod 515, 518; 88 ER 832, 833. 
42 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 226-227 [42] 
citing Parks v Wilson (1723) 10 Mod 515, 518; 88 ER 832, 833; Prebble v Boghurst (1818) 1 Swans 
309, 318-319; 36 ER 402, 407-408. 
43 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 226-227 [42]. 
44 Austin v United Dominions Corporation Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 612, 626 (Priestley JA). 
8 
 
D 19th Century  
In Astley v Weldon,45 reference was made to Sloman46 where ‘nothing but the 
damage actually sustained by breach of the agreement could be recovered’,47 and 
Hardy v Martin48 where ‘on payment of the damage actually sustained, the Plaintiff 
was restrained by the Court of Chancery from taking out execution for the 
penalty’.49 Lord Eldon concluded if a stipulated sum was very ‘enormous and 
excessive’ when considered as liquidated damages, it shall instead be taken to be a 
penalty.50 Kemble v Farren51 was another important decision52 regarding the 
development of the Doctrine as Tindal CJ refused to enforce an agreement, despite 
the sum having been described as a liquidated damages clause.53 Instead, Tindal CJ 
determined its true nature as a penalty.54 Although the plaintiff sued for the penalty, 
a verdict for actual damages sustained55 pursuant to the Statute of William III was 
handed down.56 Tindal CJ further commented:57 
But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of 
the nonpayment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered 
                                                          
45 (1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346 (‘Astley’) later approved in Elphinslone v Monkland Iron and Coal 
Company (1886) 11 App Cas 347. In Astley the parties had agreed that for three years, the plaintiff 
would pay the defendant a sum of money per week to perform at the plaintiff’s theatres. The 
defendant was required to perform such acts as required, attend the theatre half an hour before acts 
commenced and pay all fines. Any party who breached this agreement was bound to pay the other 
£2001. The defendant refused to perform at one theatre, did not attend half an hour before acts 
commenced and withdrew from performing for a long period of time. With evidence of fines 
incurred and the agreement proved, a verdict of £201 in damages was entered in favour of the 
plaintiff. However, if the court was of the opinion that the £2001 constituted liquidated damages, 
this sum would be entered instead. However, the sum was held to be a penalty: See Astley v Weldon 
(1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346, 346-348. 
46 (1783) 1 Bro CC 418.  
47 Astley v Weldon (1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346, 350. 
48 (1783) 1 Cox 26 (‘Hardy’).  
49 Astley v Weldon (1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346, 350. 
50 Ibid 351. Heath J also held an agreement containing covenants for the performance of several acts, 
together with one large sum to be paid upon breach of that performance, provides that the sum 
stipulated for must be a penalty: Ibid 353. 
51 (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234 (‘Kemble’). 
52 Coleridge J concluded in Reynolds v Bridge (1856) 6 El & Bl 528, 541; 119 ER 961, 966, with 
reference to Astley and Kemble that: ‘[I]f you find a covenant the breach of which will occasion a 
damage, not uncertain, but such as is capable of being ascertained, as where there is a particular sum 
to be paid which is much less than the sum named as payable upon the breach, there it is held that 
the last named sum is specified by way of penalty, because a Court of equity would limit the amount 
to be actually paid’.  
53 Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141, 149; 130 ER 1234, 1237. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The damages sustained amounted to a sum less than the penalty. 
56 Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141, 141-142; 130 ER 1234, 1234. Both Astley and Kemble are 
examples of the common law courts exercising their jurisdiction in accordance with the 1696 statute: 
AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 189. 
57 Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141, 148; 130 ER 1234, 1237 (emphasis added). 
9 
 
as a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms; the case being precisely that in 
which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, 
in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real 
damages sustained by the breach of the agreement. 
By the end of the 19th century it appears breach was considered a necessary 
element,58 required for compensation to be made available, the handle upon which 
equity will intervene. ‘If… [monetary compensation] cannot be made, then courts 
of equity will not interfere’59 and the Doctrine cannot apply. Non-performance or 
satisfaction of a condition, requiring payment of the bond due to breach, were 
therefore characterised as a breach of contract.60  
 
The Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK) was then enacted to extend the 
common law courts’ jurisdiction given the inconvenience of concurrent 
proceedings,61 in order to establish a common law right whilst receiving a remedy 
in Chancery.62 However, the power of the common law courts to grant injunctions 
was limited to preventing repetitious or continued contract breaches.63 The 
Judicature Acts in 1873 and 1875 rectified this problem,64 enabling each court to 
exercise both jurisdictions.65 The Statute of William III and Statute of Anne were 





                                                          
58 See, eg, Ibid; Reynolds v Bridge (1856) 6 EL & BL 528, 541; Wallis v Smith (1882) LR 21 Ch D 
243: Cited in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 624. 
59 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in England and America 
(Boston: Little and Brown, 13th ed, 1886) vol 2, 534-535 [1314].  
60 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 624. 
61 A problem existed due to the limitations of the common law regarding available remedies after a 
bond was found to be penal. Examples include the remedy of injunction required to restrain a party 
from recovering a bond at law and the relevant procedures required in order to take complex 
accounts: Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 232 [59] 
citing Edwards-Wood v Baldwin (1863) 4 Giff 613; 66 ER 851. 
62 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 232 [59]. 
63 This was with respect to preventing repetitious or continued contract breaches of which the 
plaintiff could bring an action for damages; Ibid. 
64 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 and Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875.  
65 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 624.  
66 See Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026, 1039; 1 All ER 621, 632 cited in Andrews v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 624. Administration of Justice Act 1925 
and Administration of Justice Act 1965. 
10 
 
E 20th Century  
The most significant cases regarding the development of the Doctrine occurred 
during the 20th century: Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo 
y Castaneda67 and Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co 
Ltd.68 Principles from both cases have subsisted for over a century. In Clydebank 
the Spanish Government contracted for the construction of four torpedo boats. The 
contracts contained a provision described as a penalty for the payment of £500 per 
week for delivery delays.69 As the boats were delivered many months late, the 
Spanish Government claimed for the penalty calculated at £67,500. Describing the 
£500 as a “penalty” was not conclusive as to the parties’ rights:70 The Lords looked 
to the substance and nature of the transaction. Lord Robertson decided they could 
only refuse to enforce the payments if they were ‘stipulated in terrorem and could 
not possibly have formed a genuine pre-estimate of the creditor’s probable or 
possible interest in the due performance of the principal obligation’.71   
 
The difficulty in determining whether the provision constituted a penalty revolved 
around the practical impossibility in ascertaining the damages suffered as a result 
of late delivery. The damages were not ascertainable in kind as compared to a 
‘commercial vessel [which] is ascertainable in money’.72 As stated by the Earl of 
Halsbury L.C.:73 
If it was an ordinary commercial vessel capable of being used for obtaining profits, 
I suppose there would not be very much difficulty in finding out… the hire of such 
a vessel, and what would therefore be the equivalent in money of not obtaining the 
use of that vessel… during the period which had elapsed between the time of proper 
delivery and the time at which it was delivered… 
Lord Davey also pointed out that the £500 was suggested by the appellants.74 It 
defies logic that the appellants would have offered a particular sum if they did not 
believe it to be commensurate with the loss that would be suffered. 
                                                          
67 [1905] AC 6 (‘Clydebank’). 
68 [1915] AC 79 (‘Dunlop’). 
69 ‘The penalty for later delivery shall be at the rate of £500 per week for each vessel’: Clydebank 
Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 6.   
70 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 9-10. 
71 Ibid 19 quoting Lord Kyllachy. See also ibid 10 where the Earl of Halsbury L.C. described a 
penalty as something to be held over the other party in terrorem.  
72 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 12. 
73 Ibid. 




All Lords held the provision was a valid liquidated damages clause. The distinction 
between a liquidated damages clause and a penalty relied upon ‘whether it is… 
unconscionable and extravagant, and one which no Court ought to allow to be 
enforced’.75 Lord Robertson observed that ‘the question remains, had the 
respondents no interest to protect by that clause, or was that interest palpably 
incommensurate with the sums agreed on?’76 Lord Davey also described as an 
established principle, that if you ‘find a sum of money made payable for the 
breach… and when you find that the sum payable is proportioned to the amount… 
or the rate of the non-performance of the agreement… you infer that prima facie 
the parties intended the amount to be liquidate damages and not [a] penalty’.77 
However, he stated it is always open to a party to show that the amount stipulated 
is ‘so exorbitant and extravagant’78 that the sum could not possibly have been 
regarded as damages for any breach within contemplation of the parties. 
 
This demonstrates from the 20th century that identification of a penalty was based 
upon the sum being an amount in excess or disproportionate to the other party’s 
loss. This aligns with the Earl of Halsbury L.C.’s requirement of the sum being 
unconscionable or extravagant. Although no rule was made for determining what 
would constitute as unconscionable or extravagant, it was held to depend upon the 
nature of the transaction.79 The Earl of Halsbury L.C. encapsulated this problem, as 
‘it is impossible to lay down any abstract rule as to what it may or it may not be 
extravagant or unconscionable to insist upon without reference to the particular 
facts and circumstances… established in the individual case’.80 Consideration of 
the point of time at which the contract was made was also held to be an important 
factor.  
 
Dunlop, which occurred after Clydebank, is the case most renowned for solidifying 
the rules of application with respect to the Doctrine. Dunlop involved a contract for 
the supply of tyres and tubes where the respondents had agreed not to sell items for 
                                                          
75 Ibid 10 (Earl of Halsbury L.C.). 
76 Ibid 20.  
77 Ibid 16. 
78 Ibid. 
79 This included what was to be done and the likely loss that would follow.   
80 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 10. 
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less than Dunlop’s current price list; supply to persons suspended by Dunlop; and 
export without Dunlop’s consent. A provision required the respondents to pay 
Dunlop £5 for every tyre, cover or tube sold or offered in breach of contract. The 
£5 was described as liquidated damages and not a penalty. The respondents sold 
covers and tubes at a price less than Dunlop’s current price list in breach of contract. 
Dunlop sought damages as per the contract.  
 
Lord Dunedin drew from previous cases and listed propositions as the law then 
stood. This included that the word “penalty” or “liquidated damages” was not 
conclusive;81 a penalty is the payment of money stipulated in terrorem of the party 
in breach whereas liquidated damages is a genuine pre-estimate of damage;82 and 
whether a sum constitutes a penalty or liquidated damages is a question of 
construction in light of the terms and circumstances of each contract, to be 
considered at the time the contract was entered into and not at the time of breach.83  
 
Lord Dunedin went on to frame the following well-known tests:84 
a) It will be held to be penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and 
unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach;85 
b) It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying a sum 
of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought 
to have been paid; 86 
c) There is a presumption (but no more) that it is penalty when “a single lump 
sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or 
more or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious and others 
but trifling damage”;87 
On the other hand: 
                                                          
81 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 86. 
82 Ibid citing Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6. 
83 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 86-87 citing 
Public Works Commissioner v Hills [1906] AC 368; Webster v Bosanquet [1912] AC 394. This 
essentially summarised all that was stated by the various Lords in Clydebank. 
84 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 87-88. 
85 Citing Lord Halsbury L.C. in Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda [1905] AC 6 (emphasis added). 
86 Citing Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234 (emphasis added). 
87 Citing Lord Watson in Lord Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co (1886) 11 AC 332. 
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d) It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of 
damage, that the consequences of the breach are such as to make precise 
pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On the contrary, that is just the 
situation when it is probable that pre-estimated damage was the true bargain 
between the parties.88 
Lord Dunedin stated that the above tests, if applicable to the case being considered, 
may prove helpful or even conclusive in assisting with whether a contractual 
provision constitutes a penalty.89  
 
Lord Atkinson observed90 it would be very difficult for Dunlop to prove the precise 
amount of monetary loss suffered from undercutting and considered £5 was fair 
given the breaches specified. Consequential injury to their trade from undercutting 
was in the company’s contemplation as no direct loss could be suffered from merely 
offering a tyre cover or tube for sale, at less than the price list.91 Lord Atkinson 
observed92 that in effect, the agreement provided for one obligation which was to 
sell or offer goods in accordance with the company’s price list – as Dunlop sold 
different types of goods, this single obligation could be breached in numerous 
ways.93 This appears to go against the grain of Lord Dunedin’s test (c) listed above 
and Lord Watson’s presumption, namely that the provision is a penalty where a 
single lump sum is due upon the occurrence of different events, some occasioning 
serious and others only trifling damage. However, Lord Atkinson qualified his 
reasoning and stated the presumption was rebutted because the damage caused by 
each of the events, despite their varied importance, were of such an uncertain nature 
that the damage could not be accurately ascertained.94  
 
                                                          
88 Citing Lord Halsbury L.C. in Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda [1905] AC 6; Lord Mersey in Webster v Bosanquet [1912] AC 394 (emphasis added). 
89 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 87. 
90 Ibid 91.  
91 Ibid 91-92. 
92 Lord Atkinson referred to Lord Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co (1886) 11 AC 332, 
345 (Lord Herschell) where the Court observed that an agreement had a single obligation, the breach 
of which provided for a sum in proportion to the extent of which the obligation was left unfilled: it 
did not provide a lump sum for breach of any one of several obligations which varied in importance: 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 93. Lord Atkinson 
drew upon this decision as analogous to Dunlop. 
93 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 93-94.  
94 Ibid 96. 
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The agreement for liquidated damages was therefore appropriate given the 
uncertainty in ascertaining and proving damages. Liquidated damages save parties 
the time and costs associated with proving damages in court.95 In a case such as 
this, if Dunlop was unable to prove damages they would have only received 
nominal damages which would typically be incommensurate with the consequential 
damage caused to their distribution chain. Lord Atkinson believed the uncertainty 
in ascertaining damages, provided that the £5 was not in terrorem but was a genuine 
pre-estimate of the appellants’ probable interest in performance of the agreement.96 
He observed the sum was not unconscionable, unreasonable or extravagant either.97  
 
Lord Parmoor questioned the rationality in interfering with the language of a 
contract.98 This interference with freedom of contract is one reason commentators 
criticise the Doctrine.99 Lord Parmoor stated this ‘interference should not be 
extended’,100 which is relevant in light of the recent Australian High Court decisions 
which scrutinised the history of the Doctrine and extended its application.101 Lord 
Parmoor stated ‘an extravagant disproportion’ must exist between the specified sum 
and any damages capable of pre-estimation in order to justify interference with the 
freedom to contract.102 Lord Parmoor also referred to the rule constituting a 
presumption that a penalty exists, and like Lord Atkinson, decided the presumption 
had been displaced by the inability to accurately pre-estimate the damage.103  
 
Lord Parker distinguished between cases in which the damage likely to result from 
each requirement is the same in kind, and cases in which the damage likely to result 
varies in kind with each requirement: ‘Cases of the former class seem… to be 
completely analogous to those of a single stipulation, which can be broken in 
various ways and varying damage’.104 He applied that distinction to Dunlop, 
                                                          
95 It is therefore logical for parties to agree on what those damages are, especially if the actual loss 
is difficult to ascertain.  
96 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 96. 
97 Ibid 97. 
98 Ibid 101.  
99 This interference was recognised from around the time of the doctrine’s inception.  
100 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 101. 
101 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205. See also 
Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569. 
102 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 101. 
103 Ibid 103-104.  
104 Ibid 98 (Lord Parker of Waddington).  
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deciding that the damage likely to accrue from breach of each condition was the 
same in kind, amounting to the disturbance of the company’s distribution system.105 
Subsequently all Lords agreed that the provision was a liquidated damages clause 
and not a penalty.  
 
The rules formulated by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop have been described as ‘a product 
of centuries of equity jurisprudence’.106 The Doctrine had slowly developed into a 
principled area of law by the 20th century. Breach of contract was considered a 
necessary element in order for compensation to be made available, without which, 
relief would not be granted. This requirement first emerged in the 17th century and 
was confirmed in the cases that followed. The promissory nature of the bond, was 
also evident. In the ninety-seven years following Dunlop, but prior to Andrews, the 
Australian High Court considered the Doctrine further. It is now appropriate to 



















                                                          
105 Ibid 99.  
106 Rossiter, above n 8, 33.  
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III FOLLOWING DUNLOP  
Dunlop provided the Doctrine’s foundation throughout common law 
jurisdictions.107 Examples include Australia,108 England,109 New Zealand,110 
Canada,111 Northern Ireland,112 Hong Kong,113 and Singapore.114 The Australian 
High Court applied Lord Dunedin’s rules in IAC (Leasing) Ltd v Humphrey,115 
O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd,116 and AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v 
Austin,117 confirming that the Doctrine’s application was restricted to situations 
                                                          
107 Richard J Manly, ‘Substance over Form: Australia’s Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty 
Doctrine’ (2013) 7(4) Construction Law International 19, 20. 
108 See, eg, Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656 cited in Ibid. 
109 See, eg, Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd v Tilebox Ltd [2005] EWHC 281 (TCC) cited in 
Manly, ‘Substance over Form: Australia’s Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty Doctrine’, above 
n 107, 20. 
110 See, eg, Camatos Holdings Ltd v Neil Civil Engineering (1992) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 596 cited in 
Manly, ‘Substance over Form: Australia’s Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty Doctrine’, above 
n 107, 20. 
111 See, eg, Gunning v Thorne Riddell [1990] BCJ No 36; Pattison v Mundry [1999] OJ No 65; 
Domain Forest Products Ltd v GMAC Commercial Credit Corp (2007) 29 BLR (4th) 1 cited in 
Manly, ‘Substance over Form: Australia’s Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty Doctrine’, above 
n 107, 20. 
112 See, eg, Fernhill Properties Northern Ireland Ltd v Paul Mulgrew [2010] NICh 20 cited in 
Manly, ‘Substance over Form: Australia’s Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty Doctrine’, above 
n 107, 20.  
113 See, eg, Philips Hong Kong v Attorney General for Hong Kong [1993] 1 HKLR 269; Re 
Mandarin Container [2004] 3 HKLRD 554 cited in Manly, ‘Substance over Form: Australia’s 
Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty Doctrine’, above n 107, 20.  
114 CLAAS Medical Centre Pte Ltd v Ng Boon Ching [2010] 2 SLR 396; Edward Jason Glenn v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] SGHC 61 cited in Manly, ‘Substance over 
Form: Australia’s Highest Court Reconsiders the Penalty Doctrine’, above n 107, 20. 
115 (1972) 126 CLR 131. This case confirmed the penalty doctrine’s application in instances of 
breach of contract only: ‘[I]t is only when a provision operates so that the event upon which an 
obligation is placed upon a party to pay a sum of money… is the breach by the former party of… 
the contract, that the question arises whether [the provision is] a penal. Thus if a sum has become 
payable because a party has exercised an option… the exercise of which is conditional upon a 
payment… the question of a penalty does not arise’: IAC Leasing Ltd v Humphrey (1972) 126 CLR 
131, 143.  
116 (1983) 152 CLR 359. ‘[W]here the agreement is terminated by reason of a breach committed by 
the hirer, the sum payable will be a penalty unless it is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered 
by the owner by reason of the breach’: citing Cooden Engineering Co Ltd v Stanford [1953] 1 QB 
86; Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge (1962) AC 600; Financings Ltd v Baldock (1963) 2 QB 
104. ‘If… terminated by the hirer himself… the question whether the sum payable is liquidated 
damages or a penalty does not arise’: O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 152 
CLR 359, 367. See also O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 152 CLR 359, 394, 
397-398. 
117 (1986) 162 CLR 170 (‘AMEV-UDC’). The penalty doctrine has no application to a clause which 
provides for payment of a sum on the occurrence of an event other than breach of contract: AMEV-
UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 184 (Mason and Wilson JJ) with reference to 
Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [1962] AC 600; [1962] 1 All ER 385 (affirmed in Export Credits 
Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399, 402-403; 2 All ER, 223-
224). ‘[A]n agreed sum… [should] only [be] characterised as a penalty if it out of all proportion to 
[the] damage likely to be suffered as a result of breach’: AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 
162 CLR 170, 190 citing Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428, 1447-1448; 3 All 
ER 128, 142-143. Only ‘where compensation was not possible, or damages could not be assessed… 
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where there had been a breach of contract. Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty 
Ltd118 was the last High Court decision to consider the Doctrine prior to Andrews.  
 
In Ringrow,119 BP Australia sold a service station to Ringrow who was required to 
purchase fuel from BP Australia exclusively.120 However, Ringrow breached this 
agreement,121 entitling BP Australia to terminate and either claim liquidated 
damages,122 or exercise an option to buy back the service station at market value 
excluding goodwill.123 BP Australia terminated and sought to exercise the option.124 
Ringrow claimed the option constituted an unenforceable penalty.125 Hely J at first 
instance rejected that contention.126 On appeal the Full Court of the Federal Court 
agreed with Hely J.127 Ringrow appealed to the High Court.128  
 
Ringrow referred to Lord Dunedin’s rules in Dunlop as authoritative with respect 
to penalties. This was not challenged.129 The High Court affirmed Dunlop, stating 
that this ‘formulation has endured for 90 years’130 and continues to ‘express the law 
applicable in this country’.131 The High Court determined that the Doctrine ‘in its 
standard application, is attracted where a contract stipulates that on breach the 
contract-breaker will pay an agreed sum which exceeds… a genuine pre-estimate 
of the damage likely to be caused’.132 ‘In typical penalty cases, the court compares 
what would be recoverable as unliquidated damages with the sum of money 
                                                          
that relief would not be granted’: AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 187 
(Wilson and Mason JJ) quoting Tall v Ryland (1670) 1 Chan Cas 183; 22 ER 753. 
118 (2005) 224 CLR 656 (‘Ringrow’). 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid 656. 
121 Ringrow purchased fuel from a third party; Ibid 657. 
122 This was calculated by reference to BP Australia’s expected profits over the balance of the term 
of the agreement.  
123 If BP Australia exercised the option, liquidated damages were no longer payable: Ringrow Pty 
Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 657. 
124 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 660-661 [3]. 
125 Ibid 661 [5].  
126 Ibid 658, 661.  
127 Ibid 661 [7].  
128 Ringrow argued excluding goodwill from the resale price constituted a penalty as goodwill was 
included in the purchase price paid by Ringrow. Ringrow further argued a comparison of the service 
station’s current value with the consideration due for transferring the service station back to BP 
Australia, demonstrated the option’s penal character: Ibid 664 [17].  
129 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 662-663 [11]-[12]. 
130 Ibid 663 [12].  
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid 662 [10].  
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stipulated as payable on breach’.133 However, as this involved the value of property 
transferable on a particular event,134 the High Court held this extended application 
required a different approach than typical penalty cases:135 This required a 
comparison between ‘the value of what is transferred… [with] the price to be 
received’,136 which must be extravagant and unconscionable.137 The High Court 
decided valuing the goodwill was necessary, constituting the alleged difference.138 
An expert witness gave evidence at first instance that no sources of significant 
goodwill existed.139 No new evidence was submitted.140 The High Court held it was 
therefore ‘not possible to say what, if any, money sum it has lost. Hence it is not 
possible to say that there is a penalty… which rested on a comparison of the 
consideration payable to the appellant for the transfer back… with the real value’ 
of the service station’.141  
 
Ringrow’s argument,142 that a disproportion existed between BP Australia’s 
legitimate commercial interests and the promise extracted to protect them,143 was 
also held to be irrelevant.144 The High Court stated that:145 ‘[N]either Dunlop146... 
                                                          
133 Ibid 665 [21].  
134 Ringrow submitted Lord Dunedin’s principles were not constrained to payments of money, but 
included the transfer of valuable property where that value exceeded the damage suffered: Ibid 664 
[17]. 
135 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 665 [21]. 
136 Ibid 666 [21].  
137 Ibid 666 [21]-[22].  
138 Ibid 666 [23].  
139 No sources of significant goodwill existed other than location but that this did not provide 
monetary value; Ibid. The trial judge accepted the evidence of the expert witness and held that 
Ringrow had failed to establish the existence of valuable goodwill of which Ringrow would be 
deprived due to exercising the option: Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 203 ALR 281, 
314 [146].  
140 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 666 [24]. 
141 Ibid.  
142 Ringrow stated BP Australia’s only legitimate commercial interest included preservation of the 
service station for exclusive sale of BP petroleum products during the agreement’s term. Ringrow 
argued that this interest could have been satisfied by leasing the service station to BP Australia for 
the unexpired term following termination: Ibid 664 [17].  
143 Ringrow submitted that the agreement could be terminated due to various events, some of which 
may only occasion trifling damage. Ringrow stated that this demonstrated the lack of proportion 
between breach and outcome: Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 664 
[17], [19]. Although the option could be exercised after terminating the agreement for technical 
breaches, the Court held that this only pointed to a possible ‘precondition’ of a penalty. This did not 
demonstrate so great a disparity between what BP Australia was to receive on transfer of the service 
station with a genuine pre-estimate of damage: Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 
CLR 656, 670 [35]. 
144 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 667 [27]. 
145 Ibid 667 [26]. 
146 [1915] AC 79, 86-87.  
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nor any other authority147 supports the “proportionality” doctrine which the 
appellant advanced’.148 The ‘penalty must be judged as “extravagant and 
unconscionable in amount”. It is not enough that it should be lacking in proportion. 
It must be “out of all proportion”’.149 The High Court also referred150 to AMEV-
UDC151 where Mason and Wilson JJ held an agreed sum should only be 
‘characterized as a penalty if it is out of all proportion to damage likely to be 
suffered as a result of breach’.152 The High Court then held that:153  
The principles of law relating to penalties require only that the money stipulated to 
be paid on breach or the property stipulated to be transferred on breach will produce 
for the payee or transferee advantages significantly greater than the advantages 
which would flow from a genuine pre-estimate of damage. 
The High Court therefore held the provision was not a penalty154 and affirmed the 
continuing application of the rules formulated in Dunlop. Breach of contract was 
also considered essential. The next High Court decision to consider the Doctrine, 
following Ringrow, was the controversial decision of Andrews: this decision 













                                                          
147 The appellant also relied on Pigram v Attorney-General (NSW) (1975) 132 CLR 216, 227 (Gibbs 
J); O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 152 CLR 359, 369 (Gibbs CJ), 383 
(Wilson J), 399 (Deane J). 
148 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 667 [27]. 
149 Ibid 669 [30], [32].  
150 Ibid 667 [27]. 
151 (1986) 162 CLR 170, 193.  
152 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 190 (emphasis added). 
153 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 667 [27] (emphasis added). 
154 Ibid 671 [39].  
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IV ANDREWS v ANZ 
Andrews155 is the controversial Australian High Court decision that confounded the 
legal community by extending the Doctrine to apply in instances other than breach 
of contract. This case involved a class action against ANZ regarding a variety of 
customer fees. The fees charged by ANZ were identified as honour, dishonour, and 
non-payment fees in respect of deposit accounts, and over limit and late payment 
fees in respect of credit card accounts.156 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd157 was appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court from the 
primary judgment of Gordon J, but was instead removed into the High Court. The 
High Court decision in Andrews radically transformed the way the Doctrine had 
been understood to operate given the Doctrine had only ever applied to breach of 
contract. As no explanation was given for modifying the Doctrine, the decision of 
Andrews was criticised.158 Extending the application of the Doctrine, with respect, 
required an explanation. Instead, the High Court held that because equity looks to 
substance over form, the Doctrine has always applied in situations other than 
breach. However, the history of the Doctrine demonstrates that up until Andrews 
the Doctrine only applied where damages that were dismissed as a penalty related 
to breach of contract (see Chapter II). It is now appropriate to evaluate Gordon J’s 
decision at first instance. 
 
A At First Instance 
At first instance Gordon J found that the late payment fee was payable upon breach 
of contract and was therefore capable of being characterised as a penalty.159 Gordon 
J’s decision aligned with Dunlop and the case history. ANZ did not appeal against 
                                                          
155 (2012) 247 CLR 205. 
156 Ibid 219 [19]. 
157 (2011) 288 ALR 611. 
158 ‘[T]he policy which underlies the decision in Andrews was not in fact articulated. And the concept 
of ‘penalty’ adopted by the High Court is not only convoluted, it lacks contemporary support in the 
law. Since its scope is unclear and its application uncertain, so also is the decision in Andrews. That 
seems to us unacceptable’: J W Carter et al, ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable 
Jurisdiction’ (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law 99, 132; ‘One can only guess at what the policy 
rationale was, because none was articulated, beyond a claim that this was the historical English 
position, a claim substantially refuted by the United Kingdom Supreme Court’: Anthony Gray, ‘The 
Law of Penalties and the Question of Breach’ (2017) 45 Australian Business Law Review 8, 8; See 
also Jessica Palmer, ‘Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties’ (2016) 47 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 305, 317; Anthony Gray, ‘Contractual Penalties in Australian Law After 
Andrews: An Opportunity Missed’ (2013) 18 Deakin Law Review 1, 17. 
159 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 611. 
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this finding.160 Gordon J held that the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over 
limit fees, were not charged upon the event of breach of contract by the customer.161 
Gordon J held that the occurrence of the event for which the fees were charged 
(overdrawing or attempting to overdraw) was not an event the customer had an 
obligation to avoid.162 Gordon J therefore concluded it was unnecessary to consider 
whether the fees were also capable as being characterised as a penalty,163 as the fees 
were outside the scope of the Doctrine. Gordon J held the fees were charged as a 
consequence of ANZ deciding to provide or decline further accommodation to the 
customer.164 This was not a unilateral decision by the customer as it required the 
customer to request further accommodation, with the bank accepting or rejecting 
that request, before any fee became payable.165 No obligation existed of which 
breach could occur.166 ANZ argued the fees unrelated to breach could not constitute 
a penalty. However, ANZ admitted the fees charged relating to breach of contract 
did not constitute a genuine pre-estimate of damage,167 which went against ANZ’s 
position that the fees were not penalties.  
 
Gordon J confirmed the Doctrine is ‘confined to payments for breach of 
contract’,168 and has ‘no application to contractual payments that arise upon 
termination of the agreement where the agreement is terminated on the occurrence 
of an event that does not constitute a breach of contract’.169 If the Doctrine had 
always applied to situations other than breach of contract as later held by the High 
Court, Gordon J presumably would have pointed to this in her decision. This 
application would presumably be common knowledge amongst the judiciary who 
enforce its application. This demonstrates that the High Court transformed the 
scope of the Doctrine. Gordon J also stated that the ‘court’s modern jurisdiction in 
                                                          
160 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 219 [21]. 
161 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 611-612; Ibid 
219 [22].  
162 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 611-612; 
Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 219 [22].  
163 Ibid. 
164 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 611-612, 661; 
Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 220 [23]. 
165 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 611-612. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid 611, 615. 
168 Ibid 615.  
169 Ibid 611. 
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relation to the law of penalties cannot be divorced from its origins’.170 As discussed 
in Chapter II, breach of contract was historically an essential element in order for 
compensation to be available.171 Where compensation was unavailable or could not 
be ascertained, equity would not relieve against the penalty. Gordon J explained 
that the ‘law of penalties is a narrow exception to the general rule that the law seeks 
to preserve freedom of contract’.172 
 
The applicants in Andrews173 argued that historically, equity granted relief in 
defeasible bonds despite being expressed in terms of condition and defeasance 
rather than an obligation capable of breach. The applicants argued equity looked to 
substance over form and that the scope of the Doctrine was not restricted to breach 
of contract.174 Gordon J accepted equity looked to substance over form and although 
the equitable jurisdiction was restricted to breach, it extended to matters expressed 
as condition and defeasance.175 This is no different to judges looking to the 
substance of the agreement rather than words used. In Dunlop, for example, the use 
of the words “liquidated damages” or “penalty” in describing a clause was not 
conclusive.176 Further, a defeasible bond still looked and behaved like a contractual 
agreement and a liquidated damages clause provided the sum was proportionate to 
the damage incurred. Performance of the obligation constituted the contractual 
agreement, whereas the bond constituted the liquidated damages clause. Defeasible 
bonds are therefore not analogous to a term which does not impose an obligation. 
A sum payable on an event occurring which the party had no obligation to avoid, 
cannot fall within the category of constituting, in substance, breach.   
 
The applicants in Andrews177 referred to the Statute of William III and the Statute 
of Anne in support of their argument. However, in accordance with Gordon J’s 
observation, the applicants ignored the procedural object of the statutes to 
                                                          
170 Ibid 615.   
171 Monetary compensation was required in order for equity to have a “handle” so as to provide 
relief. See, eg, Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1720) 1 Strange 447, 453; 93 ER 626, 630 (Lord 
Macclesfield); Story, above n 59, 534-535 [1314].  
172 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 615 (Gordon 
J). 
173 (2011) 288 ALR 611. 
174 Ibid 618.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 86.  
177 (2011) 288 ALR 611. 
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streamline relief against penalties:178 ‘where proceedings were brought at law by 
the obligee, the obligor would obtain from the court of law the relief for which 
otherwise it would have needed to institute a separate suit in equity to obtain’.179 
As the Statute of Anne recognised substance over form which was carried over from 
equity into the common law, the applicants argued this meant ‘common law relief 
against money bonds was available in respect of instruments which did not in terms 
impose an obligation to pay the lesser sum; terms which did not reflect a promise 
or what would later become a term of a contract’.180 Gordon J stated such a general 
proposition did not follow.181 In money bonds the bond became void upon payment 
of the lesser sum at the agreed time (the primary obligation).182 Relief was available 
when the bond required payment of a sum larger than the original stipulated 
amount.183 Gordon J held that this takes on the form of an obligation to pay the 
original amount.184 This conclusion is logical. The bond imposed an obligation 
upon a party, who, if they breached that obligation, was required to pay the bond. 
The court would only enforce that bond to the extent of actual loss suffered. 
Naturally, loss can only flow from breach. The existence of the Statute of Anne does 
not mean that the Doctrine is applicable to terms that do not impose an obligation 
upon a party.  
 
In Andrews, for example, the applicants did not breach an obligation because they 
had overdrawn their account. No obligation was imposed upon the applicants to not 
overdraw their account. It cannot follow that the Doctrine applies in that situation. 
ANZ had the option to accept or decline their instruction in providing further 
accommodation. ANZs decision dictated whether a particular fee became due. As 
Gordon J stated, this was not a unilateral action by the applicant such as failing to 
perform an obligation resulting in breach.185 The event leading to the fee required 
action by both the applicants and ANZ. No logical correlation exists between the 
applicants’ argument regarding the Statute of Anne and the current case: money 
                                                          
178 Ibid 621.  
179 Ibid 621 [26] (Gordon J). 
180 Ibid 621 [27].  
181 Ibid 621 [28]. 
182 See ibid 621. 
183 See ibid. 
184 See ibid 621 [28]. 
185 Ibid 612. 
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bonds are not analogous to situations not imposing an obligation (and therefore not 
requiring breach).  
 
The applicants cited Sloman186 and Peachy v Duke of Somerset187 in support of their 
argument but that decision lends no assistance. These cases did not discuss the 
application of the Doctrine in instances other than breach, but formulated principles 
now well established regarding the Doctrine (see Chapter II). This was also pointed 
out by Gordon J.188 The applicants also cited Ringrow,189 focusing on what the High 
Court had meant by “standard application”.190 The applicants argued that by 
recognising a standard application existed, a non-standard application must also 
exist. This non-standard application was said by the applicants to amount to a class 
of penalty which could be struck down but did not require breach of contract.191 
The phrase in Ringrow that the applicants’ referred to included:192    
The law of penalties, in its standard application, is attracted where a contract 
stipulates that on breach the contract-breaker will pay an agreed sum which exceeds 
what can be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of the damage likely to be caused by 
the breach.  
Gordon J commented that selecting a single phrase and attempting to ‘elevate it into 
an acknowledgment by the High Court that there is some other class of penalty 
which could be struck down and that this other class just happened to be (or include) 
the class of cases into which the applicants’ individual claims fell’193 was 
inappropriate. She concluded Ringrow provided no support in respect of the 
applicants’ submissions.194  
 
The applicants’ reasoning does appear to be flawed. The High Court in Ringrow 
determined that ‘[i]n typical penalty cases, the court compares what would be 
recoverable as unliquidated damages with the sum of money stipulated as payable 
on breach’ (see Chapter III).195 However, as this case involved the value of property 
                                                          
186 (1783) 1 Bro CC 418.  
187 (1720) 1 Strange 447. 
188 See Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611. 
189 (2005) 224 CLR 656. 
190 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 629.  
191 Ibid. 
192 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 662 [10] (emphasis added). 
193 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 629 [52]. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 665 [21].  
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transferable on a particular event,196 the High Court held this extended application 
required a different approach than typical penalty cases:197 This required a 
comparison between ‘the value of what is transferred… [with] the price to be 
received’,198 which must be extravagant and unconscionable.199 The High Court 
stated:200 
Lord Dunedin’s statement applies not only to cases where money is payable but also 
to cases where money’s worth (including property) is transferable on a particular 
event. In that extended application, Lord Dunedin’s statement requires a different 
approach for that employed in typical penalty cases.  
This demonstrates what the High Court meant by non-standard application.201 The 
applicants’ argument is also illogical in light of the overall judgment where the High 
Court confirmed Lord Dunedin’s rules in Dunlop as the governing principles for 
identifying a penalty clause.202 The High Court never mentioned that non-standard 
application included occurrences other than breach of contract. 
 
Further, the High Court has the power to modify the law. Presumably, the High 
Court in Ringrow would have expressly stated another class of penalty existed, if 
that was their intention, and that this included situations other than breach of 
contract. The High Court did not. However, the High Court recognised that the time 
may come when a particular feature of Australian conditions, a change in the nature 
of penalties, or an element in the contemporary market-place could suggest the need 
for a new formulation.203 In reference to an element in the contemporary market-
place, the High Court cited AMEV-UDC204 where Mason and Wilson JJ highlighted 
the importance of freedom of contract, stating ‘an agreed sum [should] only [be] 
characterized as a penalty if it is out of all proposition to [the] damage likely to be 
suffered as a result of breach’.205 Mason and Wilson JJ made no reference to breach 
                                                          
196 Ringrow submitted Lord Dunedin’s principles were not constrained to payments of money, but 
included the transfer of valuable property where that value exceeded the damage suffered: Ibid 664 
[17]. 
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200 Ibid 665-666 [21] (emphasis added). 
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204 (1986) 162 CLR 170. 
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of contract not being necessary. Instead, they referred to breach explicitly and 
inclusively. Ringrow does not assist the applicants’ argument.  
 
The remaining case that the applicants relied upon significantly was Integral Home 
Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd206where Brereton J held at 
first instance that the provision constituted a penalty. The provision allowed 
Interstar to terminate the agreement if Interstar decided that Integral had engaged 
in deceptive conduct regarding loan application files.207 Brereton J determined that 
the Doctrine was therefore applicable to a clause entitling a party to terminate a 
contract based on various events (such as insolvency or death) because the clause 
served to ‘secure the interests of the party in receiving performance of the main 
promise of the contract … [and] their effect is that the [other] party’s entitlement to 
continue to enjoy the benefit of the contract is conditional upon its not committing 
any event of default’.208 It is important to note that on the facts, the right to terminate 
the contract was not conditional upon breach and no right as to damages resulted 
from the event that entitled termination. Brereton J held that the Doctrine was not 
limited in application to contracts terminated for breach. Brereton J held the 
Doctrine extended to situations where a contract is terminated upon a right to do so, 
following the occurrence of default which the defaulting party had an obligation in 
substance to avoid. This decision was overturned209 by the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal in Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd210 
because the Court found that the Doctrine did not extend past situations involving 
breach of contract.   
 
Gordon J stated that Brereton J’s proposition had no support from case law in 
Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Hong Kong or Canada.211 Gordon J 
pointed out that although the Doctrine has had applicability with respect to 
                                                          
Characterising an agreed sum as a penalty only if it is out of all proportion to the damage likely to 
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209 Ibid [74]-[77]; See also Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 
ALR 611, 635 [72].  
210 (2008) 257 ALR 292 (‘Interstar’). 
211 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 635 [73]. 
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terminating an agreement based upon a breach of contract,212 the Doctrine has had 
no applicability213 with respect to payments falling due upon terminating an 
agreement, where the ability to terminate is based upon the occurrence of an event 
not constituting a breach of contract.214 Given this decision was overturned, it does 
not provide assistance to the applicants’ argument. In Interstar, the Court of Appeal 
stated:215  
[I]ntermediate appellate authorities in Australia, the persuasive view of a unanimous 
House of Lords, existing High Court authority and other views expressed in the High 
Court constrained the primary judge (and constrain this court) to limiting the 
application of the doctrine of penalties to circumstances of breach of contract. 
This statement reconfirms the position of the law regarding the Doctrine prior to 
Andrews and that case law history completely undermines the proposition that the 
Doctrine has always applied in instances other than breach of contract. 
 
The applicants’ argument regarding the Doctrine applying in instances other than 
breach of contract found no support in the cases cited. It therefore appears that 
Gordon J rightly dismissed their application regarding a number of fees not charged 
in relation to breach. As there had been no breach of contract, the Doctrine could 
not apply. It is relevant to point out that Gordon J, in support of her decision, 
referred to an extensive list of authority216 in Australia and the United Kingdom, all 
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of which stated that the Doctrine has no application to a provision requiring 
payment of a sum, on the occurrence of an event other than breach of contract.217 
Further, Gordon J noted218 that Lord Dunedin’s formulations from Dunlop 
including the requirement of breach, was also adopted in Canada,219 New 
Zealand220 and Hong Kong.221 Gordon J also decided that the late penalty fees were 
capable of attracting the application of the Doctrine. There was nothing exceptional 
about this decision. As stated by Gordon J:222 
The law of penalties, confined (as it is) to payments for breach of contract, is a 
narrow exception to the general rule whereby the law seeks to preserve freedom of 
contract.  
Despite these conclusions, Gordon J’s decision was appealed to the High Court.  
 
B The High Court Decision 
The High Court began by summarising what it considered to be the settled aspects 
of the Doctrine.223 This included the characterisation that a penalty is a punishment 
for the non-observance of a contractual obligation, and upon such breach, imposes 
an ‘additional or different liability’.224 A contractual term prima facie imposes a 
penalty if it is collateral to a primary obligation, and upon failing to observe that 
primary obligation the collateral stipulation imposes an additional detriment (the 
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penalty) as against the first party to the benefit of the second.225 This collateral 
stipulation is described as security for and in terrorem of satisfying the primary 
obligation.226 The court will only enforce such a clause to the extent of 
compensation for any prejudice the party suffered as a result of the failure to 
observe the primary stipulation.227 The High Court stated that as a matter of 
construction used since Peachy v Duke of Someret,228 the Doctrine does not apply 
if the damage incurred due to the failure of the primarily stipulation cannot be 
evaluated in monetary terms: ‘it is the availability of compensation which generates 
the “equity” upon which the court intervenes; without it, the parties are left to their 
legal rights and obligations’.229 The primary obligation230 and penalty need not be 
the payment of money.231 The primary obligation can be the occurrence or non-
occurrence of an event232 whilst the penalty could be the transfer or use of 
property.233 The High Court’s initial identification of a penalty is in alignment with 
a century of case law.  
 
The High Court then referred to Gordon J’s decision and that in ‘reaching her 
conclusion respecting the scope of the penalty doctrine… [Gordon J] with respect 
quite properly followed… the New South Wales Court of Appeal [decision] in 
Interstar’.234 The High Court thereby acknowledged that the application of the 
Doctrine was confined to instances of breach up until this point. Otherwise, 
presumably the High Court would have stated Gordon J had erred in her decision 
by misconstruing the scope of the Doctrine. However, the High Court stated that 
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the applicants seek to challenge the decision of Interstar, and that the challenge 
should succeed.235  
 
In support of this decision, the High Court discussed that the word “condition”, with 
respect to penal bonds, was not used in the same manner that “condition” and 
“warranty” are used today with respect to contracts.236 The High Court decided 
‘while the obligation under a bond may be said to be conditioned upon the 
occurrence of a particular event… the term “condition” is not used… with respect 
to breaches of contract’.237 The High Court then quoted238 from A Treatise on the 
Law of Contracts:239 
The common early form of contractual obligation was a bond upon condition, so that 
in the early books the word “obligation” without more is used to designate such a 
bond. The purpose of the bond obviously was, and still is, to secure performance of 
the condition, but instead of attempting to secure this result by exacting a promise 
from the obligor to perform the condition, there is an acknowledgment of 
indebtedness - in effect a promise to pay a sum of money if the condition is not 
performed.  
However, this quote provides evidence of the promissory nature of the bond. The 
bond constituted a promise to meet an obligation, where failing to do so, would 
require compensation in the form of the bond which acted like a liquidated damages 
clause. The bond was to ensure performance of the obligation and failing that, 
reduce the time and cost in exacting damages. Clearly, damages only flow from an 
event of breach, otherwise, how is loss to have occurred?  
 
The High Court cited Parks v Wilson240 and Prebble v Boghurst,241 where the 
obligation contained within the bond was the settlement or conveyance of an 
interest or estate in land, which equity may treat as evidence of an agreement to 
convey.242 In these instances, specific performance was enforced as damages were 
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considered inadequate and paying the bond insufficient. The High Court stated 
‘these cases do not establish any general proposition as to the contractual character 
of the condition in a bond’.243 The High Court did not refer to any evidence in 
support of this proposition. However, these cases did demonstrate the contractual 
nature of the bond (see Chapter II). In Parks v Wilson,244 the Court stated as much: 
‘The authorities are many in this Court, that bonds have been considered as 
evidences of agreements, and obligors held to a specific performance, and not 
allowed to forfeit the penalty’.245 If it was not contractual in nature, specific 
performance would not be available. Specific performance can only be granted 
upon breach where damages are available, but considered inadequate. Damages can 
only flow from an event occasioning loss such as breach. This conflicted reasoning 
demonstrates why the decision in Andrews confused the legal community. If the 
High Court had cited cases where bonds were held not to be of a contractual nature, 
this would have assisted their reasoning. However, it appears such cases do not 
exist.  
 
The High Court in Andrews referred to Brereton J’s decision in Integral, in support 
of their conclusion,246 but as stated previously, this decision was overturned for 
reasons already mentioned. How the stipulated sum can be assessed against 
damages incurred, in determining whether it constitutes a penalty, if the occurrence 
of an event allowing for termination is not a breach of contract, where loss is not 
determinable or assignable, is a problematic issue the Court failed to discuss. How 
could you determine whether the fee was out of all proportion? In Lordsvale 
Finance plc v Bank of Zambia247 Colman J relevantly stated that Dunlop 
demonstrated:248 
That the contractual function is deterrent rather than compensatory can be deduced 
by comparing the amount that would be payable on breach with the loss that might 
be sustained if breach occurred. 
For this reason, breach has always been an essential element. 
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The High Court in Andrews further rejected the proposition in Interstar that the 
Doctrine disappeared from equity due to absorption into the common law action of 
assumpsit.249 This is a fairly uncontentious aspect of Andrews.250 Given the 
concurrent administration of law and equity, the High Court’s reasoning is logical. 
Prior to the Judicature Acts, the Common Pleas began enforcing at law what equity 
would have enforced in Chancery (see Chapter II). This was simply to streamline 
procedures.251 However, the Doctrine still existed in equity; at times, the plaintiff 
would pursue the grant of injunction, which was only available in equity prior to 
the Judicature Acts. The High Court also referred to Dunlop, ‘where in the one 
court and in the same proceeding, legal and equitable remedies were sought by the 
plaintiff and the defendant raised the penalty doctrine in its defence’.252 However, 
although the Doctrine originated in equity and retained its equitable jurisdiction, 
this does not further the argument that the Doctrine has always applied in instances 
other than breach of contract. 
 
The High Court also referred to AMEV-UDC253 where Mason and Wilson JJ stated 
‘relief was granted, in the case of penal bonds, where there was no express 
contractual promise to perform the condition (see Hardy254), though it seems such 
a promise could in many cases readily be implied’.255 The High Court believed 
Brereton J understood the significance of the statement in AMEV-UDC,256 when 
Brereton J determined that:257  
[T]heir Honours' judgment does not decide that relief against a penalty is available 
only when it is conditioned upon a breach of contract; to the contrary, it suggests that 
relief may be granted in cases of penalties for non-performance of a condition, 
although there is no express contractual promise to perform the condition. 
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However, Mason and Wilson JJ supported the conclusion that the Doctrine only 
applies to sums that the parties have agreed are to be paid upon breach of contract.258 
Dawson J relevantly stated:259  
Treatment of the termination of an agreement upon breach in the same way as the 
breach itself for the purpose of determining whether a stipulated payment is capable 
of amounting to a penalty has no extended application. It would seem clear that a 
provision calling for the payment of money by one party on the occurrence of a 
specified event, rather than upon breach by that party, cannot be a penalty.   
 
The case referred to above by Mason and Wilson JJ is Hardy.260 It involved the sale 
of the lease and good-will of a shop to the defendant for £300 with a bond to the 
defendant of £600.261 The condition provided that the plaintiff should not for 19 
years ‘sell any quantity of brandy less than 6 gallons within the cities of London or 
Westminster, or within 5 miles thereof’,262 else the bond would become void. Lord 
Loughborough correctly stated that ‘this is… an agreement not to sell brandy, with 
a penalty for selling it’.263  
 
The plaintiff in Hardy had undertaken an obligation we now describe as a restraint 
of trade. Although the word “must” was not used, an obligation still remained not 
to sell brandy in the manner specified; this obligation was enforced by the bond. 
Hardy is similar to Cavendish where non-competition provisions protected the 
purchaser’s interests in the goodwill of the business, critical to the value of the 
business, and held not to be a penalty.264 Hardy is not, however, analogous to 
Andrews where fees became due following a decision by ANZ. In Hardy the 
plaintiff took unilateral action to trade against the condition agreed which caused 
the bond to fall due. As Lord Loughborough stated ‘the penalty is never considered 
in this court, as the price for doing what a man has expressly agreed not to do. The 
                                                          
258 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 184, 189-90 cited in Andrews v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 633. 
259 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 211 (emphasis added) cited in Andrews 
v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 611, 633. 
260 Hardy v Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26, 26. This case is also referred to by the High Court in Andrews 
and Brereton J in Integral.   
261 Hardy v Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26, 26. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid 27. 
264 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [75] (Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [179]–[180] (Lord Mance), [274] (Lord Hodge). See also Paciocco 
v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2016) 333 ALR 569, 583.  
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court will restrain him from setting up a trade in opposition to his own agreement, 
although he has paid the penalty.’265 This demonstrates the promissory nature of the 
bond as the plaintiff was estopped from trading because there was an ‘agreement 
not to do a thing, with a penalty for doing it.’266 The court held quantum 
damnificatus267 to be determined.268 In light of these facts, it does not follow that 
this case provides authority for the proposition that the Doctrine applied in instances 
other than breach. As already established, bonds were of a promissory nature. The 
court in Hardy relevantly referred to Rolfe v Peterson,269 which involved land, 
demised to a lessee.270 If the land was used in a particular way, he was to pay one 
rent, but if used in another way, a different rent.271 Hardy distinguished this case as 
it did not involve an ‘agreement not to do a thing, with a penalty for doing it.’272 
Accordingly, equity would not intervene as the agreement lacked the required 
promissory nature.273  
 
The High Court in conclusion held that the Court of Appeal’s view in Interstar274 
regarding the constraints of the Doctrine should not be accepted.275 The High Court 
determined that Gordon J erred when deciding that the fees could not be 
characterised as a penalty in the absence of a contractual breach or an obligation to 
avoid the event upon which the fees were charged.276 However, it is the obligation 
or breach which assigns liability in order for losses to be attributed to a particular 
party. Without this liability, damages cannot attach and damages are required in 
order for compensation to be made available. As stated above, monetary 
compensation allows equity a “handle” with which to intervene. Without 
compensation, no comparison can be made with the stipulated sum and the Doctrine 
cannot apply. The High Court’s conclusion in Andrews that the Doctrine can apply 
                                                          
265 Hardy v Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26, 26-27. 
266 Ibid 27. 
267 An issue directed by a court of equity to be tried in a court of law, to ascertain before a jury the 
amount of damages suffered by the non-performance or breach of contract. The court will grant 
relief upon payment of damages once ascertained. 
268 Hardy v Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26, 27. 
269 (1772) 6 Bro PC 470. 
270 Hardy v Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26, 27. 
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in instances other than breach,277 or without an obligation, appears to go against the 
fundamental principles of the Doctrine. However, the High Court is well within its 
power to reformulate the Doctrine. As Australia and the United Kingdom share a 
jurisdictional history with respect to the Doctrine, it is now appropriate to evaluate 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Cavendish which commented on 




















                                                          
277 Contra: Commentators overwhelmingly support the fact that the penalty doctrine can only apply 
in instances of breach of contract See, eg, Carter et al, ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the 
Equitable Jurisdiction’, above n 158. See also Gray, ‘Contractual Penalties in Australian Law After 
Andrews: An Opportunity Missed’, above n 158, 12 citing as examples of academic support for this 
proposition: J W Carter and Elisabeth Peden, ‘A Good Faith Perspective on Liquidated Damages’ 
(2007) 23 Journal of Contract Law 157, 160; Eric L Talley, ‘Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism 
Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule’ (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1195, 1200; Robert E 
Scott and George G Triantis, ‘Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract 
Law’ (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 1428, 1441: ‘By the end of the eighteenth century, common 
law courts had adopted the equity rule of relief from the bond where the amount owed greatly 
exceeded the loss to the plaintiff from the breach of the condition’; Charles J Goetz and Robert E 
Scott, ‘Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an 
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 554, 555: 
‘[T]he equity courts apparently refused enforcement when either actual or presumptive evidence of 
unfairness indicated that recovery would result in an “unjust, extravagant, or unconscionable 
quantum of damages in case of a breach”’ (emphasis altered) quoting Seymour D Thompson, 
‘Penalties and Liquidated Damages’ (1898) 46 Central Law Journal 5; Bruno Zeller, ‘Penalty 
Clauses: Are They Governed by the CISG?’ (2011) 23 Pace International Law Review 1, 1: ‘[A] 
penalty clause or fixed sum is a pre-determined amount of money which becomes due in the event 
of a breach of contract’ (emphasis added); James P George, ‘Reimposable Discounts and Medieval 
Contract Penalties’ (2007) 20 Loyola Consumer Law Review 50, 59; Biancalana, ‘Contractual 
Penalties in the King’s Court 1260–1360’, above n 7, 223.  
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V CAVENDISH v MAKDESSI 
In Cavendish278 the United Kingdom Supreme Court discussed the extended 
application of the Doctrine in Andrews. This case involved the defendant selling a 
controlling interest in an advertising company to the plaintiff.279 The agreement 
provided that the plaintiff would pay up to $147 million in instalments, depending 
on the calculated profits.280 This largely reflected the goodwill.281 The parties 
further agreed282 that for a period of time following the sale the defendant was not 
to compete with his old business, otherwise he would be disentitled to further 
payments.283 The plaintiff also had an option284 to buy the defendant’s remaining 
shares at a price excluding goodwill.285 The defendant breached the non-
competition clause.286 The plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant was not 
entitled to additional payments and was required to sell his shares.287   
 
At first instance Burton J held the clauses were not penal and made the declarations 
sought.288 On appeal, the clauses were held to constitute a penalty as the clauses 
acted as a deterrent and were not genuine pre-estimates of loss.289 On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the plaintiff claimed that the clauses were not penalties and that the 
Doctrine should be abolished or restricted with respect to commercial transactions 
between parties of equal bargaining power, acting upon skilled legal advice.290 The 
Supreme Court held that the clauses were not penalties.291 The Court determined 
that the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in the non-competition clauses being 
observed, which extended beyond recovery of loss because the defendant’s loyalty 
was critical to the goodwill, which was critical to the value of the business.292 The 
                                                          
278 [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015). 
279 Ibid [46]. 
280 Ibid [48]-[49].  
281 Ibid [51].  
282 Under clause 5.1. 
283 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [51]-[52]. 
284 Under clause 5.6. 
285 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [55], [63]. 
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289 Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2013] EWCA Civ 1539, [125]-[131] (Patten, 
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Stone-Cum-Ebony JSC). 
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Court held both parties were sophisticated and commercially experienced, 
bargaining on equal terms with expert legal advice. For this reason, the parties were 
‘the best judges of the degree to which each of them should recognise the proper 
commercial interests of the other’.293  
 
The Court held ‘that a provision could not be a penalty unless it provided an 
exorbitant alternative to common law damages. This meant it had to be a provision 
operating on a breach of contract’.294 Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption 
JSC295 referred to the House of Lords decision in Export Credits Guarantee 
Department v Universal Oil Products Co,296 stating this is settled law in England. 
As stated by Lord Roskill:297 
[P]erhaps the main purpose, of the law relating to penalty clauses is to prevent a 
plaintiff recovering a sum of money in respect of a breach of contract committed by 
a defendant which bears little or no relationship to the loss actually suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the breach by the defendant. But it is not and never has been 
for the courts to relieve a party from the consequences of what may in the event 
prove to be an onerous or possibly even a commercially imprudent bargain. 
The Supreme Court determined the reason for this is that: 298 
[T]he courts do not review the fairness of men's bargains... The penalty rule regulates 
only the remedies available for breach of a party's primary obligations, not the 
primary obligations themselves. 
 
Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC stated that at times, the application 
of the Doctrine could depend on how the obligation is framed within the 
instrument.299 This was explained well:300 
[W]here a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also 
provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum 
                                                          
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid [12] (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord 
Carnwath JSC agreed).  
295 Lord Carnwath JSC agreed. 
296 [1983] 1 WLR 399. 
297 Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399, 403 (the 
rest of the committee agreed). Lord Hodge JSC also further pointed out that the Scottish authorities 
are to the same effect. 
298 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [13] (Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Carnwath JSC agreed). 
299 Either as a primary obligation, or secondary obligation, providing for a contractual alternative to 
damages; Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [14]. 
300 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [14]. 
38 
 
of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is 
capable of being a penalty; but if the contract does not impose (expressly or 
impliedly) an obligation to perform the act, but simply provides that, if one party 
does not perform, he will pay the other party a specified sum, the obligation to pay 
the specified sum is a conditional primary obligation and cannot be a penalty. 
However, Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC relevantly pointed out that 
the consequences of this are mitigated, as classifying the terms used depends on 
substance and not form, or the label used by parties.301  
 
The Court held that the parties’ bargaining positions are an important consideration. 
Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC stated with respect to a ‘negotiated 
contract between properly advised parties of comparable bargaining power, the 
strong initial presumption must be that the parties themselves are the best judges of 
what is legitimate in a provision dealing with the consequences of breach’.302 Lord 
Mance JSC stated the extent of which parties negotiated with legal advice and at 
arm’s length, must be a relevant factor in deciding what is extravagant or 
unconscionable.303 Considering the parties’ bargaining power was also discussed in 
Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong,304 where Lord Woolf 
considered whether ‘one of the parties to the contract is able to dominate the other 
as to the choice of the terms of a contract’ in deciding whether a clause constituted 
a penalty.305 Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC referred to Mason and 
Wilson JJ’s view in AMEV-UDC,306 where courts are able to ‘strike a balance 
between the competing interests of freedom of contract and protection of weak 
contracting parties’.307 In Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments 
Ltd,308 Lord Browne-Wilkinson also supported considering the parties’ bargaining 
                                                          
301 Ibid [15]. See also Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1962] AC 600, 622.  
302 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [35] (Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Carnwath JSC agreed).  
303 Ibid [152] (Lord Mance JSC).   
304 [1993] 61 BLR 41 cited in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 
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305 However, this did not mean the courts could thereby adopt some broader discretionary approach; 
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306 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 194 citing Atiyah, P S, The Rise and 
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positions.309 Unfortunately the Court in Andrews did not consider the bargaining 
position of the parties and the use of standard form contracts in relation to the 
question of penalties. The position taken by the United Kingdom in this respect is 
beneficial to construing whether a clause constitutes a penalty. 
 
The Supreme Court stated ‘until recently, the law in Australia was the same as it 
was in England’,310 and that Andrews signalled ‘a radical departure from the 
previous understanding of the law’.311 Although Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord 
Sumption JSC admitted whether the Doctrine applies can occasionally turn on a 
somewhat formal distinction, their Honours agreed this anomaly is justified for 
infringing upon freedom of contract and ought not to be extended, at least not by 
the judiciary as opposed to the legislative.312 Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord 
Sumption JSC drew an analogy between Andrews and the Office of Fair Trading v 
Abbey National plc313 which are factually similar.314 However, in that case, the 
banking fees could not be characterised as a penalty given no breach of contract had 
arisen.315 The Court disagreed with the reasoning in Andrews and determined that 
the United Kingdom jurisdiction should not follow Australian law, because aside 
from ‘its inconsistency with established and unchallenged House of Lords 
authority… the reasoning in… Andrews… [is] entirely historical, [but] is not in fact 
                                                          
309 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, 520 cited in 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [35] (Lord 
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314 This case involved the application of the penalty doctrine to contractual bank charges payable 
when the bank bounced a cheque, or when the bank allowed the customer to draw in excess of their 
available funds or of their agreed overdraft limit. These may be regarded as banking irregularities, 
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315 See Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2008] EWHC 875 (Comm), [295]-[299] cited 
in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [41] (Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Carnwath JSC agreed).   
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consistent with the equitable rule as it developed historically’.316 Lord Neuberger 
PSC and Lord Sumption JSC held the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
penalties arose in the context of bonds defeasible in the event of a failure to perform 
a contractual obligation and thus, breach of that contractual obligation was a 
required element.317  
 
Lord Hodge JSC also held the ‘rule against penalties applies only in the context of 
a breach of contract’.318 Lord Hodge JSC referred to the ‘controversial decision’319 
of Andrews, ‘satisfied that the rule against penalties in both English and Scots law 
has applied only in relation to secondary obligations – penal remedies for breach of 
contract’:320 In Scotland, the Doctrine has no application in cases not involving 
breach of contract.321 Lord Hodge JSC stated no freestanding equitable jurisdiction 
exists with which to apply the Doctrine to instances other than breach of contract.322 
Lord Hodge JSC concluded the correct test in determining whether a provision 
constitutes a penalty, is whether an ‘extravagant disproportion [exists] between the 
stipulated sum and the highest level of damages that could possibly arise from the 
breach’.323  
Lord Mance JSC also stated in relation to Andrews:324 
I do not see the distinction between situations of breach and non-breach as being 
without rational or logical underpinning. It is true that clever drafting may create 
apparent incongruities in particular cases. But in most cases parties know and reflect 
in their contracts a real distinction, legal and psychological, between what… a party 
can permissibly do and what… constitutes a breach and may attract a liability to 
damages for – or even to an injunction to restrain – the breach. 
                                                          
316 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [42] (emphasis 
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The Court further stated that if a distinct equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
penalties subsisted, broader than the common law, it left no trace aside from three 
possible exceptions since the “fusion” of law and equity in 1873.325 However, Lord 
Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC cited each case326 explaining why these 
cases are not on point or why it was decided incorrectly. For example, in In re 
Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co; Ex p Hulse327 Sir James and Sir Mellish LJJ treated 
the clause as a forfeiture, and therefore the purchaser in the same way as a 
mortgagor in possession requesting additional time to pay. In In Robophone 
Facilities Ltd v Blank,328 the exception was ‘no more than an unsupported throw-
away line [by] Diplock LJ… where he said it was “by no means clear” whether 
penalty clauses “are simply void”, but, on analysis, he was dealing with a rather 
different point’.329 Lord Hodge JSC concluded that a penalty clause is 
unenforceable and that Jobson v Johnston330 should be overruled given the Court 
was incorrect to have modified a penalty clause.331 ‘The treatment of a penalty 
clause as partly enforceable… is contrary to consistent modern authority’.332 Lord 
Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with respect to this point, mentioned that 
the law of penalties is the same in England and Scotland and yet, equity has never 
been a distinct branch of law within the Scotland jurisdiction.333 Lord Mance JSC 
further pointed out that other common law countries including Canada, Scotland, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong and New York have a Doctrine broadly in 
alignment with the Doctrine to that of the United Kingdom.334  
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In conclusion, the Supreme Court importantly stated with respect to Andrews 
that:335 
[T]he High Court’s redefinition of a penalty is, with respect, difficult to apply to the 
case to which it is supposedly directed, namely where there is no breach of contract. 
It treats as a potential penalty any clause which is “in the nature of a security for and 
in terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation.” By a “security” it means a 
provision to secure “compensation … for the prejudice suffered by the failure of the 
primary stipulation”. This analysis assumes that the “primary stipulation” is some 
kind of promise, in which case its failure is necessarily a breach of that promise. If, 
for example, there is no duty not to draw cheques against insufficient funds, it is 
difficult to see where compensation comes into it, or how bank charges for bouncing 
a cheque or allowing the customer to overdraw can be regarded as securing a right 
of compensation. Finally, the High Court's decision does not address the major legal 
and commercial implications of transforming a rule for controlling remedies for 
breach of contract into a jurisdiction to review the content of the substantive 
obligations which the parties have agreed. Modern contracts contain a very great 
variety of contingent obligations... There are provisions for termination on 
insolvency, contractual payments due on the exercise of an option to terminate, 
break-fees chargeable on the early repayment of a loan… provisions for variable 
payments dependent on the standard or speed of performance and “take or pay” 
provisions in long term oil and gas purchase contracts... The potential assimilation 
of all of these to clauses imposing penal remedies for breach of contract would 
represent the expansion of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction into a new territory of 
uncertain boundaries, which has hitherto been treated as wholly governed by mutual 
agreement. 
As Australia and the United Kingdom share a jurisdictional history regarding the 
Doctrine, these differences’ of opinion are significant. The Supreme Court 
identified the inherent problems associated with extending the Doctrine and refused 
to do so. It is now appropriate to evaluate the High Court decision in Paciocco 
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VI PACIOCCO v ANZ 
A Case Facts 
The decision in Paciocco was handed down after Andrews and Cavendish. 
Paciocco was a highly anticipated decision because the Australian High Court 
would confirm or overrule the decision of Andrews which extended the application 
of the Doctrine. Paciocco involved consumer credit card fees charged by ANZ and 
is factually similar to Andrews. Mr Paciocco argued the various honour, dishonour 
and non-payment fees charged by ANZ were void as penalties, or alternatively, 
contravened statutory provisions relating to unconscionable conduct and unfair 
contract terms.336 The late payment fees are charged to customers who are late in 
making their monthly repayments and is charged regardless of the outstanding 
monthly payment amount.337 The late payment fees incurred by Mr Paciocco were 
the sum of $35 (charged until December 2009) and $20 (charged from December 
2009). ANZ argued that the late payments impacted upon ANZ through operational 
costs, loss provisioning and increases in regulatory capital costs.338 Operational 
costs included costs incurred in ensuring late payments were made, such as 
administration costs and costs of staff contacting Mr Paciocco.339 Loss provisioning 
costs and increases in regulatory capital costs were described as impacting on 
ANZ’s financial interests.340 ANZ is required to hold regulatory capital in order to 
cover unexpected losses.341 The required regulatory capital increases when risk of 
default increases.342 Although a valid liquidated damages clause is usually a pre-
estimate of the damage likely to be incurred in instances of default, ANZ did not 
determine the late payment fee by estimating losses it might incur because of Mr 
Paciocco’s delayed payments:343 ANZ admitted the fees were not genuine pre-
estimates of damage.344 This admission is important because a presumption arises 
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that the fee constitutes a penalty. The costs clearly identified as arising from Mr 
Paciocco’s late payments amounted to approximately $3.345  
 
Mr Regan gave evidence for Mr Paciocco regarding costs ANZ incurred due to the 
late payments, whilst Mr Inglis gave evidence for ANZ.346 Mr Regan calculated 
costs as including those incurred by ANZ in ensuring the late payments were made, 
such as operational costs and administration costs.347 Mr Inglis calculated ANZ’s 
incurred costs by taking into account operational costs, loss provisioning and capital 
regulatory costs.348 Mr Inglis calculated costs at a figure ‘significantly greater’349 
than the late penalty fees, taking into account impacts on or costs to financial 
interests.350 Mr Inglis calculated costs of breach to be as high as $147, which was 
described as ‘overly generous’.351 At first instance Gordon J pointed out that ‘in a 
competitive financial market, it is difficult to accept that a prudent bank would 
allow exception fee events to occur at all if the costs of each event far outstripped 
the amount of the fee’.352 Relevantly, Mr Inglis took into account provision and 
regulatory capital costs which he accepted were not actually incurred, both 
generally and specifically with respect to some of the exception fee events.353 
Gordon J did not accept regulatory capital could be taken into account in calculating 
damages resulting from the late payment:354  
Banks seek damages limited to the sums outstanding, enforcement costs and 
interests. No one has suggested that a bank would be entitled to recover an increase 
in provisioning or the cost of its regulatory capital.355  
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Traditionally courts have only enforced damages, costs and interest when the 
Doctrine has applied. Gordon J referred to Andrews and Dunlop in determining that 
the late payment fees constituted a penalty:356  
The question was ‘to what extent (if any) did the amount stipulated to be paid exceed 
the quantum of the relevant loss or damage which can be proved to have been 
sustained by the breach, or the failure of the primary stipulation, upon which the 
[collateral] stipulation was conditioned.357  
Gordon J held the late payment fee was in terrorem, or security for, satisfaction of 
the primary stipulation and was extravagant and unconscionable.358 Gordon J held 
that the honour, dishonour and overlimit fees were not penalties as they were not 
payable upon breach of contract.359 Gordon J held that the fees did not contravene 
the statutory provisions identified.360  
 
On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that the late payment fees did 
not constitute a penalty and did not contravene statutory categories of 
unconscionable conduct or unfair contract terms.361 The Full Court considered 
Gordon J had erred when she accepted and applied evidence that ANZ could only 
have suffered direct costs associated with recovering the minimum payment 
outstanding as a result of the late payments.362 The Full Court held other evidence 
given for ANZ which determined costs more broadly regarding ANZ’s financial 
interests, should be taken into account instead.363 The Full Court held that this 
demonstrated ANZ’s legitimate interests in performance of the payment terms and 
that the fees could not be characterised as penalties.364 The Full Court agreed with 
Gordon J regarding the remaining fees. Mr Paciocco appealed the Full Court’s 
decision on the late payment fees to the High Court.365 The conclusion regarding 
the other fees was not challenged.366   
 
                                                          
356 See Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2014) 309 ALR 249, 256 [4], 
259-261. 
357 Ibid 292 [184].  
358 Ibid 256 [4]. 
359 Ibid 294 [198], 303 [249], 305 [260], 306 [271].  
360 Ibid. 
361 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 584, 585.  
362 Ibid 604.   
363 Ibid 622 [153].   
364 Ibid 585, 629.    
365 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 571-572. 
366 Ibid 572.  
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B Andrews Confirmed 
Commentators hoped the High Court decision of Paciocco would clarify the 
decision of Andrews regarding the current application of the Doctrine. Only French 
CJ commented on Andrews who stated Gordon J had correctly followed Interstar367 
in Andrews:368 this confirms, as did the High Court in Andrews, that prior to 
Andrews the scope of the Doctrine was limited in application to breach of contract. 
The appeal in Paciocco involved characterisation of a clause enlivened upon breach 
of contract if enforceable.369 As the applicability of the Doctrine in instances other 
than breach was not an issue before the High Court, it appears no in depth analysis 
was made. However, French CJ stated a ‘difference has emerged since the decision 
in Andrews between the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and this Court in 
relation to the scope of the law relating to penalties’370 and that it is ‘desirable to 
say something about the fact of divergence between our jurisdictions’.371 French CJ 
confirmed the decision of Andrews and Dunlop as providing the governing 
principles regarding the application of the Doctrine in instances of breach.372 French 
CJ commented on the decision of Cavendish stating a shared heritage does not 
import the necessity of developments proceeding on similar lines.373 French CJ did 
not address the comments made in Cavendish regarding the decision of Andrews 
having radically departed from the previous understanding of the law.374 Instead, 
CJ French referred to the separate jurisdictions and that ‘the common law in 
Australia is the common law of Australia’.375 Whilst a valid point, it may have been 
beneficial if these comments had been addressed directly. Identifying that the 
Doctrine had been extended or is believed to have been extended, and explaining 
why this was required would have provided answers sought after since Andrews. 
French CJ only noted ‘more than one account of its construction and more than one 
view of whether it should be abrogated or extended or subsumed by legislative 
                                                          
367 (2008) 257 ALR 292. 
368 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 572 [3].  
369 Ibid 572-573.  
370 Ibid 573 [6].  
371 Ibid.  
372 Ibid 573 [5].  
373 French CJ also stated that the ‘emphatic disagreement between our jurisdictions in relation to the 
common law and equitable doctrines, while infrequent, is not novel’; Ibid 574 [7].  
374 See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [41]. 
375 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 574 [9] citing 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 562-566. Reference is also 
made to the enactment of the Australia Acts and the abolishment of the last remaining appeal avenue 
from the Supreme Courts to the Privy Council. 
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reform is reasonably open’.376 French CJ concluded that perhaps in Australia 
‘statutory law reform offers more promise than debates about the true reading of 
English legal history’.377  
 
C The High Court’s Decision 
The High Court determined the nature of the loss regarding the late payment fees 
was the same in kind as the loss sustained in Dunlop and Clydebank. Arguably, this 
loss is not analogous. The loss sustained in Dunlop regarding direct damages 
flowing from breach was intangible. In actuality the dealers were short changing 
themselves by selling products at a price less than the list price. As Lord Atkinson 
articulated in Dunlop, ‘in the sense of direct and immediate loss the appellants lose 
nothing by such a sale. It is the agent or dealer who loses by selling at a price less 
than that at which he buys’.378 The damages were of a different kind, constituting a 
legitimate interest that went to their distribution systems.379 As the damages 
sustained could not be ascertained in monetary terms380 the court would not grant 
equitable relief by way of the Doctrine. As stated by the Court in Cavendish, the 
‘£5 was not a penalty on the ground that an exact pre-estimate of loss was 
impossible’.381 As the High Court stated in Andrews, ‘it is the availability of 
compensation which generates the “equity” upon which the court intervenes’ 
without which ‘the parties are left to their legal rights and obligations’.382   
 
In comparison with the intangible loss sustained in Dunlop, the loss sustained by 
ANZ was calculated to $3.383 As the late payment fees were $35 and $20 
respectively, these fees are arguably extravagant and unconscionable with respect 
to the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved. Gordon J had, arguably 
                                                          
376 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 575 [10]. 
377 Ibid.  
378 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 91 (emphasis 
added). See also Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 
88 (Lord Dunedin). 
379 Ibid 92, 96 (Lord Atkinson), 99 (Lord Parker of Waddington).  
380 Ibid 96 (Lord Atkinson).  
381 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [24] (Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Carnwath JSC agreed) 
citing ibid 87 (Lord Dunedin), 98 (Lord Parker), 103 (Lord Parmoor).  
382 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, 217 [11]. See 
also Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 652 [125] 
(Gageler J). 
383 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2014) 309 ALR 249, 251. 
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correctly, reached this conclusion. Granted, the fact ANZ did not pre-estimate the 
damage is not proof itself that the fees constitute a penalty. However, the High 
Court’s decision that the late payment fees did not constitute a penalty rested on the 
idea that ANZ had a legitimate interest in ensuring customers pay on time. They 
may do, but this interest is too far removed from losses sustained when actual 
damages can be determined in monetary terms. This is where Dunlop and Paciocco 
are distinguished.  
 
In typical penalty cases, ‘the court compares what would be recoverable as 
unliquidated damages with the sum of money stipulated as payable on breach’.384 
As damages sustained by ANZ could be ascertained, the stipulated sum should be 
compared as against these damages. As the sum must be extravagant and out of all 
proportion, an amount greater than the actual loss suffered may not necessarily 
amount to a penalty.385 However, the $35 charged is 1166% greater than the loss 
incurred: the $35 is arguably extravagant and out of all proportion. The same can 
be said of the $20. Although the sums themselves may not seem large, the sum 
recovered is so far above the identifiable loss that it is unconscionable.  
 
The High Court stated that looking forward from the time the contract was made as 
to possible costs is important.386 Whether the provision constitutes a penalty is 
judged ‘as at the time of the making of the contract, not as at the time of breach’.387 
However, the fee of $35 and $20 is so extravagant when compared to the $3 loss, 
that it cannot constitute a genuine forward-looking estimate. The subjective 
intention of the party is also irrelevant,388 although ANZ already admitted the fees 
were not a forward-looking estimate. The High Court determined it was wrong to 
                                                          
384 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 665 [21]. See also Paciocco v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 640 [320]. 
385 See Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 584 [53]-
[54] (Kiefel J). See also Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 669 [31]-[32] 
where exceptions from freedom of contract ‘require good reason to attract judicial intervention to 
set aside the bargains upon which parties of full capacity have agreed’, which is why the penalties 
doctrine is an exceptional rule expressed in exceptional language.  
386 See Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 586 [62], 
619 [236]. 
387 See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 87 (Lord 
Dunedin). 
388 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 621 [243] citing 
O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 152 CLR 359, 400 (Deane J).  
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compare the actual loss with the stipulated sum.389 This defies common sense. 
Although correct to ‘assess that loss by reference to the economic interests to be 
protected’,390 ANZ’s economic interests is recouping costs associated with the late 
payment. How else can you determine whether the sum is out of all proportion 
without comparing the two?  
 
The loss incurred by ANZ is arguably not of the loss in kind as determined in 
Clydebank either. Clydebank (see Chapter II) involved the Spanish Government 
contracting to build four torpedo boats.391 These warships were delivered many 
months late. 392 As stated by the Earl of Halsbury LC, the damages were not 
ascertainable in kind as compared to a ‘commercial vessel [which] is ascertainable 
in money’.393 As the loss was not ascertainable, the equitable relief of the Doctrine 
was not applicable. It is only by comparing the greatest loss that could be proved to 
have followed from the breach, that a court can determine whether the stipulated 
sum is extravagant in comparison. If losses cannot be calculated, a court cannot 
determine whether the clause was unreasonable and parties are left to their 
agreement. In comparison, ANZ’s losses can be ascertained in monetary value. 
Relief against the late payment fees should have been provided. The High Court’s 
rationale394 in respect of not requiring losses to have flowed is also flawed. How 
else will the court determine whether the sum is out of all proportion without losses 
to compare against? As stated by Kiefel J:395 
[E]quity’s jurisdiction was considered not to extend to a case when compensation 
was not thought to be possible, as is the case when damages could not be assessed. 




                                                          
389 See for example, Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 
569, 600. 
390 Ibid 593. 
391 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 6-7. 
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393 Ibid 12.  
394 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 572-574 
confirming Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205. 
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A presumption exists that a sum constitutes a penalty when a sum is made payable 
on the occurrence of one or more of several events, some of which may occasion 
serious and others but trifling damage.396 Despite differences in the monthly 
repayment amounts and time taken to repay, the late payment fee remained the same 
which points to the presumption of a penalty. Although a presumption can be 
rebutted by evidence to the contrary, Gordon J relevantly stated the ‘same fee was 
payable regardless of whether the customer was 1 day or 1 week late (or longer), 
and regardless of whether the amount overdue was $0.01 (trifling), $100, [or] 
$1000’.397 An example includes charges of $20 made to Mr Paciocco’s credit card 
account. One charge was made when the outstanding monthly balance was $268 
with a minimum monthly repayment of $10.398 Another charge was made when the 
outstanding monthly balance was $4,055 with a minimum monthly repayment of 
$80.399 This variance,400 especially the repayment of $10 whilst incurring a $20 fee, 
demonstrates why this presumption should apply.  
 
D The High Court’s Reasoning 
I Kiefel J 
The High Court referred to a number of cases in concluding that the late payment 
fee was not a penalty. Dunlop was referred to in respect of protecting interests said 
to be ‘different from, and greater than, an interest in compensation for loss caused 
directly by the breach of contract’.401 Kiefel J held that the question is ‘whether a 
provision for the payment of a sum of money on default is out of all proportion to 
the interests of the party which it is the purpose of the provision to protect’.402 Kiefel 
J held ANZ had an interest in receiving timely credit repayments.403 Kiefel J further 
                                                          
396 See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 87 (Lord 
Dunedin). 
397 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2014) 309 ALR 249, 280 [119]. See 
also Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 592 [103]. 
398 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 590 [89]. 
399 Ibid.  
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401 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 579 [26] (Kiefel 
J). 
402 Ibid 580 [29]. Kiefel J further determined that Lord Atkinson’s statement was important regarding 
whether the stipulated sum was commensurate with the interest protected by the agreement: Ibid 
579 [28] citing Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 91-
92.  




described Lord Dunedin’s rule that a sum will constitute a penalty if ‘extravagant 
and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach’,404 as ‘unduly restrictive’ 
if only damages directly flowing from breach can be considered.405 That may be so, 
but the Doctrine has always had a narrow application, for it otherwise undermines 
contractual certainty.  
 
ANZ claimed in its defence that costs incurred due to late payments were very 
difficult to calculate.406 Although measuring the loss ANZ sustained may be 
difficult,407 it is not practically impossible as has been the test in previous cases. 
These costs are therefore not in a similar nature as the losses in Dunlop which were 
‘practically impossible’408 to calculate and Clydebank which were 
unquantifiable.409 Kiefel J stated the courts in Dunlop and Clydebank found the 
damage was capable of estimation with little precision,410 but not impossible to 
estimate.411 Although the courts in Dunlop and Clydebank left the parties to their 
agreement,412 Kiefel J stated this did not occur as the court determined whether the 
fee was unconscionable.413 This is not entirely accurate. The reason the Court 
determined whether the fee was extravagant in Dunlop was because it had fallen 
within the presumption of being a penalty, as the same fee was stipulated in respect 
of different events of varying significance; requiring this presumption to be 
rebutted. In Dunlop it was decided that when ‘damages caused by a breach of 
contract are incapable of being ascertained, the sum made by the contract payable 
on such a breach is to be regarded as liquidated damages’.414 As the Court 
determined that ‘any accurate pre-estimate of damage would be practically 
impossible’,415 the sum was found not to be a penalty. 
                                                          
404 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 87. 
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II Gageler J 
Gageler J referred to Clydebank and Dunlop in determining that the stipulation may 
protect the party’s interests in contractual performance which are ‘intangible and 
unquantifiable’.416 As ANZ’s loss was quantifiable, it makes no sense to draw 
analogies between Clydebank and Dunlop, with Paciocco. Gageler J also reasoned 
Lord Dunedin’s use of “damage” as opposed to “damages” meant it was not a 
reference to the amount of compensation the party would be entitled to in an action 
for breach of contract.417 However, it appears “damage” is used in reference to the 
loss suffered flowing from breach. Lord Dunedin’s reference to ‘greatest loss that 
could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach’418 appears to 
invalidate Gageler J’s reasoning as this directly refers to compensatory damages. 
 
III Keane J 
Keane J admitted a ‘large disparity [exists] between the late payment fee charged 
by ANZ [with respect to Mr Regan’s calculations] and the expenses actually 
incurred’.419 ‘[I]ndicia which could not be ignored’ and pointed to a penalty420 
included this large disparity, the primarily stipulation being the payment of money 
and the late payment fees not varying with the amount overdue or length of payment 
delay. Keane J also discussed that ANZ’s legitimate interests were not confined to 
the reimbursement of expenses directly occasioned by the customers default and 
maintenance or enhancement of the revenue stream explains the late payment fee.421 
However, when he accepted ANZ’s interest in making a profit which is not confined 
to the reimbursement of expenses, this constitutes a contradiction when also 
accepting Mr Inglis’s evidence of ANZ’s costs of up to $147, as the High Court 
had, which far exceeded the late payment fee.  
 
As Gordon J pointed out, ANZ’s priority is to make a profit so why would ANZ 
incur losses every time a payment was late? During the financial year which ended 
September 2009, ANZ charged the late payment fee on 2.4 million occasions: 
                                                          
416 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 604 [161]. 
417 Ibid 600 [145].  
418 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, 87. 
419 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 614 [215]. 
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ANZ’s revenue from charging the late payment fee was about $75 million.422 For 
this reason, Mr Regan’s evidence should be preferred to Mr Inglis’s evidence. 
ANZ’s interest in making a profit is true for every commercial enterprise and 
therefore unexceptional. A business’s interest in making a profit should not justify 
the use of what would otherwise be a penalty. Nevertheless, the losses actually 
sustained by ANZ at $3 are out of all proportion to the late payment fees of $35 and 
$20: arguably this fee is collateral to the primary obligation of paying on time and 
only exists to ensure performance of the primary obligation. The late payment fee 
should therefore be unenforceable.  
 
Keane J stated perhaps ‘other laws concerned with the unfair or unreasonable use 
of superior bargaining power’ will affect the validity of a provision that may not 
otherwise constitute a penalty.423 The problem with statutory provisions that protect 
against unfair contract terms or unconscionability is that they look to the way in 
which a bargain was agreed. This is why the statutory arguments raised by Mr 
Paciocco failed.424 This also demonstrates why Australia should consider reforming 
the Doctrine to allow the parties’ bargaining positions to be taken into account. 
Keane J mentioned the Doctrine does not operate to displace the parties’ freedom 
to allocate themselves their rights and liabilities.425 However, this is not applicable 
if a standard form contract is used or the parties’ bargaining powers are unequal, 
such as in Paciocco. The Doctrine assumes parties freely negotiate their agreement 
which is not always correct. Mr Paciocco had no ability to negotiate his rights – this 
was pre-determined by ANZ. It would therefore be beneficial if courts considered 
the bargaining positions when construing whether a clause constitutes a penalty.   
 
Keane J compared Paciocco to ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis426 where £85 was charged 
to customers who overstayed the free two hours parking, reducible to £50 if paid 
within 14 days. The comparison his Honour drew was that although the carpark 
operator did not suffer a loss from customers who overstayed the two hour free 
parking, the carpark operator had a legitimate interest in charging the fee.427 
                                                          
422 Ibid 591 [97], 650 [369]. 
423 Ibid 616 [221].  
424 See ibid 570.  
425 Ibid 616 [221].  
426 [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015).  
427 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 627 [266]. 
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However, this comparison cannot be drawn: ANZ did suffer loss as a result, 
ascertainable in monetary terms. This case is not analogous and can be 
distinguished. 
 
IV Nettle J 
Nettle J referred to Ringrow428 where the High Court re-articulated the Dunlop 
tests:429 a penalty is ‘out of all proportion’430 to the ‘greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach’.431 Nettle J importantly 
stated:432 
[W]here a bargain is for the provision of a credit card facility made available at an 
agreed rate of interest, the lender's only legitimate interest in the enforcement of the 
primary obligation is repayment of the facility with interest at the agreed rate plus 
adequate recoupment of any costs imposed on the lender as a result of the customer's 
failure to adhere to the terms of the facility… [T]he lender's interest to be protected 
by the bargain does not extend to the payment of a liquidated sum that is 
disproportionate to any amount of additional costs imposed on the lender by reason 
of the breach. 
This statement demonstrates why Paciocco should have been decided differently. 
Nettle J also referred to Cavendish and Dunlop where the parties’ interests were 
unable to be compensated,433 and determined that ANZ did not establish such a 
broad legitimate interest: ‘there is no evidence or other indication of any interest to 
be protected by the timeous performance of the Monthly Payments obligation apart 
from the avoidance of costs’.434 This observation is accurate. Nettle J determined 
the Doctrine’s primary purpose is to prevent a party recovering a sum on breach of 
contract which bears little or no relationship to the loss actually suffered as a 
result.435 Nettle J concluded in reference to AMEV-UDC,436 which was re-affirmed 
in Andrews, that ‘there seems to have been no instance of equity awarding 
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compensation over and above the amount awarded as common law damages, other 
than cases in which equity would not relieve against the penalty’.437  
 
In determining which Dunlop tests applied, Nettle J concluded Gordon J was correct 
in applying test 4(a) and test 4(c).438 Test 4(a) encompasses whether the late 
payment fee was extravagant in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach.439 Test 4(c) includes that 
a presumption arises that the payment is a penalty due to the late payment fee being 
the same in amount, irrespective of the monthly payment amount required to be 
paid and the extent of lateness in payment.440 With respect to “greatest amount of 
damage”, Nettle J stated that in accordance with Chitty on Contracts,441 ‘the word 
“damage” in this context means “net loss” after taking account of the claimant’s 
expected ability to mitigate’.442 This is similar to what was proposed earlier in this 
Chapter. Nettle J also disagreed with the Full Court that Gordon J took an ex post 
approach to identifying the conceivable loss.443 He reasoned that because Gordon J 
concluded the late payment fee was a fixed amount irrespective of the magnitude 
and duration of the late payment, no ex facie relationship between the fee and 
resulting loss existed which gave rise to the presumption of a penalty.444 In 
determining whether the presumption was rebutted, Gordon J had compared the fee 
with the amount recoverable as damages.445 Gordon J completed this process in 
accordance with test 4(a) and test 4(c). Nettle J’s conclusion that Gordon J had not 
undertaken an ex post approach is logical after considering no ex facie relationship 
between the fee and resulting loss existed.  
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Nettle J critiqued Mr Inglis’s evidence and identified problems associated with his 
calculations.446 This included that a provision for bad debts was not an incurred loss 
and was only an estimate regarding future loss447 which may or may not be 
incurred.448 A further problem included that Mr Inglis made numerous calculations 
on a per account basis as opposed to a per late payment basis, which was used for 
his other calculations.449 Nettle J also recognised Mr Paciocco had no ability to 
negotiate the contract due to ANZ’s bargaining power and the standard form 
contract.450 This factor was discussed earlier in this Chapter. Only Nettle J 
concluded, correctly, in the author’s view, that the late payment fee constituted a 
penalty and that the Full Court’s decision should be set aside.451  
 
E Policy Decision 
The High Court dismissed the appeal.452 The arguably incorrect decision of 
determining that the late payment fees did not constitute a penalty was based in 
policy. If these late payment fees were held to be unenforceable, ‘interest rates or 
other charges could be expected to rise at the expense of those customers who 
adhere to their contractual engagements’.453 Protection against losses and the 
possibility of risk would have to be reassigned, most likely to the regular customer 
in increased interest rates who has not failed to make repayments in time.454 Further, 
many cases may then have come before the courts, not only regarding ANZ but 
other different lending institutions charging similar fees.455 In light of French CJ’s 
comments and the arguably incorrect decision of Paciocco, it is now appropriate to 
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VII REFORMS  
French CJ confirmed the decision of Andrews and Dunlop in Paciocco as providing 
the governing principles regarding the Doctrine’s application.456 French CJ 
therefore confirmed the application of the Doctrine in instances other than breach. 
As stated by French CJ, ‘more than one account of its construction and more than 
one view of whether it should be abrogated or extended or subsumed by legislative 
reform is reasonably open’.457 Although, the High Court extended the Doctrine in 
Andrews, French CJ suggested statutory law reform.458 Other reforms have also 
been suggested over the years. It is now appropriate to consider each reform in turn 
and explore whether these reforms may be beneficial, given the recent 
reformulations by the High Court.  
 
A Legislative Reform 
French CJ suggested statutory law reform.459 However, the Earl of Halsbury L.C. 
encapsulated in Clydebank460 the problem created by attempting to codify the 
Doctrine: ‘[I]t is impossible to lay down any abstract rule as to what it may or it 
may not be extravagant or unconscionable to insist upon without reference to the 
particular facts and circumstances which are established in the individual case’.461 
The difficulty of creating statutory regulation broad enough to cover the field of 
what could constitute a penalty, yet specific enough to apply in every circumstance, 
is one of the reasons statutory reform is difficult. What does or does not constitute 
a penalty is specific to the facts and circumstances of the case, something which the 
presiding judge evaluates. Relevantly, the Scottish Law Commission’s Report on 
Penalty Clauses (1999) recommended the retention of judicial control over 
penalties.462 Further, this recommendation concluded that ‘[j]udicial control over 
contractual penalties should apply whatever form the penalty takes’.463  
 
                                                          
456 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 333 ALR 569, 573 [5]. 
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461 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 10. See 
also Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [293] (Lord 
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One benefit of statutory law reform would be the added certainty that would come 
with codifying the rules of application, in light of the recent High Court decisions. 
It is difficult to ascertain with certainty the reasons why French CJ suggested 
statutory reform as the most appropriate step as he gave no reasons for that view. A 
primary reason is presumably to solidify the extension of the Doctrine following 
Andrews and Paciocco. Statutory reform may alleviate any remaining confusion 
regarding the rules of application. However, if statutory reform would only provide 
a reiteration of the principles formulated in Andrews and Paciocco, it may not offer 
much value, and, depending on how the legislation is drafted, may in fact restrict 
the application of the Doctrine. In this respect, it may be best if judicial control over 
penalties remain. Further, there appears to be a general consensus within the 
European Civil Codes towards recognising the value of retaining judicial control of 
disproportionate, excessive, or unreasonable penalties.464 Examples include the 
Council of Europe's Resolution 78 (3) of 20 January 1978 on Penal Clauses in Civil 
Law,465 the Principles of European Contract Law (2002),466 the UNCITRAL 
Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon Failure of 
Performance (1983)467 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (2010).468 All contain provisions for judicial control.469 Ultimately 
however, recommending statutory law reform depends on the terms of the proposed 
legislation, without which, it is difficult to conclude with certainty. 
 
B Abrogated 
The Doctrine has existed in England, as well as Scotland, since the 16th century.470 
However, it has been argued, as in the first appeal of Cavendish,471 that the Doctrine 
should be abrogated.472 The applicant argued that the rule is antiquated, anomalous 
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[22]-[148]. 
471 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [36] (Lord 
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and unnecessary, especially given the statutory regulation in this area.473 However, 
the Court concluded ‘we do not consider that judicial abolition would be a proper 
course for this court to take’.474 The Australian High Court in Ringrow relevantly 
pointed out that the Doctrine ‘has been applied countless times in this and other 
courts’.475 As the Doctrine still finds application today, such as in Andrews and 
Paciocco, the Doctrine cannot be characterised as unnecessary. As Lord Mance JSC 
stated, ‘there would have to be shown the strongest reasons for so radical a reversal 
of jurisprudence which goes back over a century in its current definition and much 
longer in its antecedents’.476 
 
One argument for abrogating the Doctrine is that statutory regulation exists which 
did not exist at the time of the Doctrine’s inception.477 In the United Kingdom, for 
example, penalty clauses were controlled by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 and Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008.478 However, these Regulations only applied to consumer 
contracts and the control of unfair terms did not apply to contracts individually 
negotiated.479 This last limitation was sensibly removed by introducing the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015.480 However, these statutory regulations still only apply 
to consumer contracts. Non-consumer contracts not regulated by statute are 
regulated by the Doctrine. Notably, neither the English Law Commission in 1975481 
nor the Scottish Law Commission in 1999,482 recommended abrogating the 
                                                          
473 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [36] (Lord 
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Doctrine.483 In Cavendish, the court refused to abolish the Doctrine, stating that it 
‘had a useful role to play in protecting people against some categories of oppressive 
bargain which were not subject to statutory regulation’. Further, the United 
Kingdom has similar statutory regulation to Australia. The Court’s reasons in 
Cavendish for deciding against abrogating the Doctrine despite statutory regulation 
is therefore relevant in considering such reform in Australia.  
 
In Australia, similar statutory regulation exists, including prohibitions against 
unconscionable conduct and unfair contract terms under the Australian Consumer 
Law (contained in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)).484 
Sections 20-21 prohibit unconscionable conduct whilst s 22(1)(a) allows the court 
to consider the parties’ relative bargaining positions when assessing 
unconscionability. However, this provision applies to contracts for the supply or 
acquisition of goods or services and excludes public listed companies.485 Section 
23 prohibits unfair contract terms in standard form contracts. Section 25(c) states 
‘a term that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, one party (but not another 
party) for a breach or termination of the contract’ is an example of a term that may 
be unfair. However, this provision only applies to consumer contracts and small 
business contracts involving the supply of goods or services, or a sale or grant of an 
interest in land.486 Parties and contracts which fall outside these categories are not 
protected by this legislation. Statutory regulation did not provide protection in 
situations such as those dealt with in Andrews and Paciocco. For this reason, 
statutory regulation in this area may not be sufficient to cover the field.  Notably, 
the Law Reform Commission of Victoria provided a discussion paper on the 
Doctrine in 1988,487 and stated that any associated problems of the Doctrine could 
be ‘resolved without abandoning the rule against penalties’.488 Ultimately, the Law 
Reform Commission of Victoria recommended a more flexible rule be 
                                                          
483 See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [38] (Lord 
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implemented, where courts have the discretion to set aside provisions which are 
‘unconscionable in all the circumstances’.489  
 
A party to a commercial contract may still be vulnerable as ‘there remain significant 
imbalances in negotiating power in the commercial world’.490 The Doctrine also 
protects vulnerable commercial parties who do not receive protection under the 
statutory regulation. The Doctrine provides an avenue of relief for such parties that 
may be otherwise unavailable. Further, the Australian High Court chose to extend 
the Doctrine in Andrews, in spite of statutory regulation. This demonstrates the 
Doctrine’s continuing relevance and importance.    
 
Although justified criticisms regarding the Doctrine exist, such as that it infringes 
upon freedom of contract, the Doctrine is consistent with other well established 
principles which allow the court to decline in giving full force to contractual 
stipulations.491 Examples of such include equity of redemption, relief from 
forfeiture and refusing to grant specific performance.492 In Cavendish, the party’s 
argument for abolishing the Doctrine depended heavily upon anomalies in the 
operation of the law. The Court in Cavendish held that many of these anomalies are 
best addressed ‘by a realistic appraisal of the substance of contractual provisions 
operating on breach, and by taking a more principled approach to the interests that 
may properly be protected by the terms of the parties’ agreement’.493 Further, utility 
exists in allowing parties the opportunity to sensibly agree for themselves the 
consequences of breach in order to avoid expensive disputes.494 The premise of 
liquidated damages is still of value to parties. 
 
Finally, the Doctrine is common to almost all major law systems in the western 
world and has been adopted, albeit with some variants, in all common law 
                                                          
489 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Liquidated Damages and Penalties, Discussion Paper No 
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jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, Canada,495 New Zealand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and the United States.496 An example from United States is § 2-718(1) 
of the Uniform Commercial Code which states that liquidated damages must be at 
a level considered reasonable in light of anticipated or actual harm caused by breach 
of contract and that a ‘term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as 
a penalty’.497 A corresponding penalty rule derived from Roman law by Pothier498 
is also found in the Civil Codes of France,499 Germany,500 Switzerland,501 
Belgium502 and Italy.503 These Codes allow for modification of contractual penalties 
if they are manifestly excessive or disproportionately high.504 The Doctrine was 
also included in attempts to codify contract law internationally. As noted above, 
this includes the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(2010)505 and the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed 
Sum Due upon Failure of Performance (1983).506 Further, the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (2009) provides for reducing payments for non-performance of a 
contract if grossly excessive.507 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe in January 1978 also recommended various common principles.508 One such 
was that a sum payable on breach of contract could be reduced by the court when 
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manifestly excessive.509 The global commonality of the Doctrine and the principles 
of which it is founded demonstrates its necessity, relevance and value within the 
law broadly. For these many reasons, abrogating the Doctrine in Australia would 
be detrimental to our legal system and to vulnerable parties. Abrogating the 
Doctrine is therefore not recommended.  
 
C Subsuming the Doctrine 
Some commentators suggested subsuming the Doctrine into the principle of 
unconscionability.510 One reason for this includes that conscience and fairness is at 
the heart of the Doctrine and the reason for court intervention.511 However, courts 
are more likely to find unconscionable conduct where procedural unfairness 
resulted in formation of the contract:512 Within the principle of unconscionability, 
the distinction between procedural unfairness and substantive unfairness is 
evident.513 Procedural unconscionability refers to unfair negotiating processes and 
methods of forming contracts.514 Relevant factors include ‘absence of meaningful 
choice, superiority of bargaining power, [use of] an adhesion contract,515 unfair 
surprise, sharp practices or deception’.516 Substantive unconscionability refers to 
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unfair substantive terms of the contract and overall unjust results.517 Whether 
substantive unconscionability exists varies according to the commercial setting in 
which the contract is formed.518 Some factors include the ‘relationship between 
price and consideration received, whether onerous terms bear a reasonable 
relationship to business risks, and the relative fiscal positions of the parties’.519 In 
application to the Doctrine, unconscionability could specifically refer to the agreed 
sum,520 relationship of the parties,521 together with unfair compulsion of 
performance.522 In order to subsume the Doctrine into the principle of 
unconscionability, commentators such as Gray have suggested the court consider 
the content of substantive clauses rather than only procedural matters.523  
 
An argument against this proposal includes that ‘it is unsatisfactory to make general 
appeals to fairness or unconscionability’ with respect to the Doctrine:524 The 
Doctrine must be principled and based on clear policy foundations instead.525 A 
relevant problem associated with this reform is that the protection provided under 
the Australian Consumer Law526 does not apply to all types of parties and 
contracts.527 An example includes s 23 which prohibits unfair contract terms in 
standard form contracts. This provision only applies to consumer contracts and 
small business contracts involving the supply of goods or services, or a sale or grant 
of an interest in land.528 Gaps in the legislation therefore exist with which the 
Doctrine plays an important role in providing protection that would not exist if 
subsumed into the unconscionability principle. A further problem includes that this 
proposed reform would require the courts to take a substantive approach to the 
                                                          
517 Ibid. See also Clark, above n 514, 30. 
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contract in determining whether it is unconscionable. This goes against the freedom 
of contract principle. As stated by Lord Roskill, ‘it is not and never has been for the 
courts to relieve a party from the consequences of what may in the event prove to 
be an onerous or possibly even a commercially imprudent bargain’.529 The courts 
role is supervisory. As Callinan J observed, ‘courts are not armed with a general 
power to set aside bargains simply because in the eye of a particular judge, they 
might appear to be unfair, harsh or unconscionable’.530 The courts are not meant to 
undertake a review of the substantive terms of the contract themselves. As Manly 
noted, it ‘is a well-established principle of the common law that it is not for the 
courts to rewrite contracts’.531 Gray’s suggestion that the ‘law needs to abandon its 
traditional reluctance when dealing with unconscionability principles to consider 
substantive unconscionability, while continuing to uphold freedom of contract’532 
is in itself a contradiction. Unfortunately, one cannot be upheld if the other is. This 
proposed reform is therefore, not recommended.  
 
D Extended 
As the Australian High Court has already extended the scope of the Doctrine, the 
arguments surrounding extension are no longer of practical significance. However, 
it is relevant to briefly identify the benefits and detriments associated with this 
reform given it has been implemented. In comparison, the court in Cavendish 
declined to follow the Australian High Court and held that the Doctrine should not 
be extended to include clauses which ‘imposed onerous obligations on a party on 
certain contingencies which did not involve a breach of contract, since the courts 
had no power at common law to regulate the parties’ primary obligations’.533 This 
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is a valid concern, as it is not for the judiciary to determine the astuteness of 
contractual bargains. This is a primary reason why extending the Doctrine to apply 
in instances other than breach has received criticism. As Mason and Wilson JJ 
stated in AMEV-UDC,534 the courts have always ‘maintained a supervisory 
jurisdiction, not to rewrite contracts imprudently made, but to relieve against 
provisions which are so unconscionable or oppressive that their nature is penal 
rather than compensatory’.535 Palmer relevantly suggested that the ‘parties’ 
stipulated remedies cannot extend beyond the courts’ own [remedial] limits, 
otherwise the institution of contracting itself is threatened by the loss of the courts’ 
ability to supervise and enforce the bargain’:536 the Doctrine protects the court’s 
remedial jurisdiction.537 The unenforceability of penalties ensures the judiciary 
maintain their function of governing relief which cannot be avoided or overridden 
by contractual stipulations. The court in Cavendish also raised a valid point:538  
There is a fundamental difference between a jurisdiction to review the fairness of a 
contractual obligation and a jurisdiction to regulate the remedy for its breach. 
Leaving aside challenges going to the reality of consent, such as those based on 
fraud, duress or undue influence, the courts do not review the fairness of men’s 
bargains either at law or in equity. The penalty rule regulates only the remedies 
available for breach of a party’s primary obligations, not the primary obligation 
themselves. 
 
A problem identified with respect to extending the scope of the Doctrine, is that this 
further interferes with freedom of contract539 and further undermines the certainty 
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with which parties are entitled to contract. Extending the Doctrine to apply in 
instances other than breach means that the ‘penalty doctrine is more likely to be 
invoked’540 creating further uncertainty within contracts. ‘The law of penalties is a 
narrow exception to the general rule that the law seeks to preserve freedom of 
contract, allowing parties the widest freedom, consistent with other policy 
considerations, to agree upon the terms of their contract’.541 As Lord Woolf stated 
in Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong:542 ‘the court has to be 
careful not to set too stringent a standard and bear in mind that what the parties have 
agreed should normally be upheld. Any other approach will lead to undesirable 
uncertainty especially in commercial contracts’.543 Allowing parties the freedom to 
contract results in their ability to ‘determine more precisely their rights and 
liabilities consequent upon breach or termination, and thus enables them to provide 
for compensation in situations where loss may be difficult or impossible to 
quantify... avoid[ing] costly and time-consuming litigation’.544 In Cavendish, Lord 
Clarke further stated that although the application of the Doctrine can turn on 
questions of drafting, despite taking a substantive approach, this ‘can be justified 
by the fact that the rule “being an inroad upon freedom of contract which is 
inflexible… ought not to be extended”, at least by judicial, as opposed to legislative, 
decision-making’.545  
 
Despite these criticisms, benefits in extending the Doctrine also exist. An example 
includes the irregularity546 identified by Lord Denning in Bridge v Campbell 
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Discount Co Ltd547 with respect to the Doctrine only applying in instances of breach 
of contract: ‘let no one mistake the injustice of this. It means that equity commits 
itself to this absurd paradox: it will grant relief to a man who breaks his contract 
but will penalise the man who keeps it’.548 This observation is correct but the reason 
behind this is valid: courts are meant to regulate the remedy for breach as opposed 
to reviewing the substantive fairness of agreements. Extending the Doctrine means 
that this anomaly will no longer arise. ‘With skilful drafting, remedial clauses can 
be converted into primary obligations or conditional collateral obligations that are 
out of reach of the rule against penalties’.549 Another benefit in extending the 
Doctrine is that parties can no longer easily circumvent or avoid the application of 
the Doctrine by clever drafting.550 Further, support for extending the Doctrine is 
present in other jurisdictions. Reports conducted prior to statutory regulation by the 
English Law Commission in 1975551 and the Scottish Law Commission in 1999,552 
recommended that the application of the Doctrine be expanded to include 
                                                          
547 [1962] AC 600; 1 All ER 385. 
548 Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [1962] AC 600, 629; 1 All ER 385, 389. 
549 Palmer, above n 158, 318 citing Sarah Worthington, ‘Common Law Values: The Role of Party 
Autonomy in Private Law’ in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of 
Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart Publishing, 2016) 301, 316.   
550 See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [40], [130] 
[258]; Harder, above n 477, 58-59: ‘It facilitates a circumvention of the rule against penalties since 
the structure of an option or an indulgence may be used for what is in substance an obligation 
triggered by breach’; Patrick Easton, ‘Penalties Percolating through the Construction Industry: 
Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2013) 29 Building and Construction 
Law Journal 233, 239. Contra ‘The problem of evasion of the rule by clever drafting is probably 
not resolvable and it would create huge uncertainty and transactional expense if all contractual 
clauses could be subjected to the scrutiny of the court’: Palmer, above n 158, 318 citing Bobby 
Lindsay, ‘Penalty Clauses in the Supreme Court: A Legitimately Interesting Decision?’ (2016) 20 
Edinburgh Law Review 204, 207. 
Further, the court in Cavendish identified in situations where it is clear that the parties have avoided 
the penalty doctrine’s application, and that the substance of the contractual stipulation is to impose 
a punishment for breach, the courts ability to focus on the substance of the term should enable the 
court to identify a disguised penalty and intervene: Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] 
UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [258] (Lord Hodge JSC) citing Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto 
Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433, 445-446 (Bingham LJ). ‘In the United Kingdom, concerns 
over attempts to redraft provisions to form additional services caused the Office of Fair Trading to 
release a position statement in 2006, which stated that attempts to restructure accounts in order to 
present events of default spuriously as additional services for which a charge may be made should 
be viewed as disguised penalties’: Patrick Easton, ‘Penalties Percolating through the Construction 
Industry: Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2013) 29 Building and 
Construction Law Journal 233, 240. This provides one reason why extending the penalty doctrine 
is less desirable in the United Kingdom as opposed to Australia given this potential benefit already 
exists. 
551 English Law Commission, Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid, Working Paper No 
61 (1975) 12-19.  
552 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Penalty Clauses, Report No 171 (1999) 12-14. See also 
Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2016) 333 ALR 569, 575 [10]; 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [38] (Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Carnwath JSC agreed).  
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circumstances other than breach of contract.553 Many national European legal 
systems contain similar provisions.554 An example includes the laws in France of 9 
July 1975 and 11 October 1985 which amended article 1152 of the Code Civil.555  
 
Although the Australian High Court already extended the Doctrine, hopefully 
Australian courts will still consider the importance of freedom of contract when 
applying it. As Diplock LJ stated in Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank556 ‘the court 
should not be astute to descry a penalty clause’.557 Given the policy decision in 
Paciocco, it appears courts are not particularly willing to declare that a penalty 
exists, despite use of a standard form contract, which means the courts are not 
infringing upon freedom of contract in the truest sense. However, if bargaining 
power and use of a standard form contract had been considered, ideally Paciocco 
would have been decided differently. Protecting weaker parties while allowing 
parties the freedom to contract in order to create commercial certainty is a fine line. 
As stated by Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ in 
Ringrow:558  
Exceptions from that freedom of contract require good reason to attract judicial 
intervention to set aside the bargains upon which parties of full capacity have agreed. 
That is why the law on penalties is, and is expressed to be, an exception from the 
general rule. It is why it is expressed in exceptional language.   
 
E Taking into Account the Bargaining Position of the Parties 
A problem with the Doctrine is that the rules are premised on the assumption that 
the parties have freely agreed the terms of their contract. However, a party’s 
bargaining power impacts upon their ability to contract feely. A powerful party will 
be in a position to influence the terms of the agreement at the weaker party’s 
                                                          
553 See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [38] (Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Carnwath JSC agreed), 
[163] (Lord Mance JSC), [263] (Lord Hodge JSC). See also Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Limited (2016) 333 ALR 569, 575 [10].  
554 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [165] (Lord 
Mance JSC). 
555 Code Civil [Civil Code] (France). This reversed the effect of Cour de cassation [French Court of 
Cassation] decision in Paris frères c Dame Juillard Civ 14 February 1866; Ibid. 
556 [1966] 1 WLR 1428, 1447 quoted in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 
67 (4 November 2015) [33], [248]. 
557 Ibid.   
558 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656, 669 [32].  
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expense. Taking into account the parties’ bargaining positions is a relevant 
proposed reform that Australia could implement. As recognised in Cavendish, 
‘there remain significant imbalances in negotiating power in the commercial world. 
Small businesses often contract with large commercial entities and have little say 
as to the terms of their contracts’.559 In Cavendish, the bargaining positions of the 
parties was a relevant consideration when the court construed whether or not the 
clause constituted a penalty. The Court held that the parties were ‘sophisticated, 
successful and experienced commercial people bargaining on equal terms over a 
long period with expert legal advice’560  and ‘were the best judges of the degree to 
which each of them should recognise the proper commercial interests of the 
other’.561 The Court concluded that in a contract negotiated between parties of equal 
or comparable bargaining power, the initial presumption must be that the parties 
themselves are best equipped at determining the consequences of breach.562  
 
In AMEV-UDC563  Mason and Wilson JJ also identified the nature of the 
relationship between contracting parties as a relevant factor regarding the 
unconscionableness in enforcing the relevant clause.564 In Philips Hong Kong Ltd 
v Attorney General of Hong Kong565 Lord Woolf suggested that a relevant 
consideration when applying the Doctrine included  situations where one party was 
able to dominate the other regarding choice of contract terms.566 Lord Woolf 
qualified this suggestion by stating that the courts could not thereby adopt some 
broad discretionary approach in deciding whether a clause is penal.567 He saw this 
as striking a ‘balance between the competing interests of freedom of contract and 
protection of weak contracting parties’.568 The parties’ bargaining position as a 
relevant consideration was also supported by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Workers 
                                                          
559 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [262] (Lord 
Hodge JSC). 
560 Ibid [75].  
561 Ibid.  
562 Ibid [35] (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord 
Carnwath JSC agreed). 
563 (1986) 162 CLR 170.  
564 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 193-194. 
565 [1993] 61 BLR 41.  
566 Ibid 58-59 cited in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 
2015) [35], [257]. 
567 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [35].  
568 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 194 (Mason and Wilson JJ) citing 
Atiyah, above n 306, ch 22.  
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Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd.569 Kirby P in Citicorp 
Australasia Ltd v Hendry570 lamented that no authority existed for taking into 
account the parties’ bargaining position when assessing whether the clause 
constituted a penalty.571 Kirby P commented that the current law was unsatisfactory 
and considering the parties’ bargaining power was one change he would 
contemplate if free from authority to do so.572 Relevantly, the Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria recommended implementing Kirby P’s suggestion, in that 
the courts be given the discretion to set aside provisions which are ‘unconscionable 
in all the circumstances’. 573  
 
The rules of the Doctrine are also premised on the assumption that parties have 
freely negotiated individual terms of their contract. However, standard form 
contracts are frequently used which do not allow the parties to negotiate the terms 
of their agreement. Examples where this issue has arisen include Andrews574 and 
Paciocco.575 Diplock LJ recognised this problem in Robophone Facilities Ltd v 
Blank576 where he noted that many contracting parties could not contract à la carte 
but had to accept the table d'hôte of the standard term contract.577 Other jurisdictions 
have recognised the relevance of the standard form contract. In Germany, the Civil 
Code578 empowers the court to reduce any penalty to an appropriate amount under 
section 343. Section 343 applies to non-business contracts whilst commercial 
                                                          
569 [1993] AC 573, 580. 
570 (1985) 4 NSWLR 1. 
571 Citicorp Australasia Ltd v Hendry (1985) 4 NSWLR 1, 23 cited in Baron, above n 511, 297. 
572 Citicorp Australia Ltd v Hendry (1985) 4 NSWLR 1, 22–23 (Kirby P): ‘Thus, the endeavour by 
a finance house, in a printed form, to impose conditions for breach upon a B consumer borrowing a 
small sum, without the benefit of legal advice, would be treated differently to a commercial 
enterprise borrowing large sums for a business venture upon which it has the advantage of legal 
advice’. ‘This would enable the court to adopt a ‘more sensitive and discriminating approach’ so 
that where a party had commercial experience and the advantage of legal advice the court need not 
arrive at the same result as it would [if] faced with a different relationship’: Lanyon, above n 524, 
258 citing AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 564.  
573 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Liquidated Damages and Penalties, Discussion Paper No 
10 (1988) 13. 
574 See Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205. 
575 See Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2016) 333 ALR 569, 588 
[77] where the terms and conditions on which ANZ contracted with Mr Paciocco were contained 
within three standard form documents.  
576 [1966] 1 WLR 1428, 1447. See also Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 
(4 November 2015) [257] (Lord Hodge JSC). 
577 Cited in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [257] 
(Lord Hodge JSC); Tasmania v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] TASSC 133 [40]. 
578 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] (Germany) (‘BGB’). 
72 
 
contracts are exempt under the Commercial Code.579 Importantly, this exemption 
does not include standard form contracts.580 Germany has recognised that the use 
of standard form contracts requires a different approach as the parties have not feely 
negotiated the terms of their agreement. Courts do not recognise the effect of a 
standard form contract when applying the Doctrine in Australia.581 However, the 
court taking into account the parties’ bargaining positions allows the use of standard 
form contracts to become a relevant factor. As these considerations are procedural 
and not substantive, they do not infringe upon freedom of contract or the 
supervisory role of the courts. This thereby avoids the associated problems of 
subsuming the Doctrine into the principle of unconscionability. Further, although 
these factors should be considered, these factors are not determinative.582  
 
Considering the parties’ bargaining positions does not reformulate the Doctrine to 
exclude commercial transactions altogether where parties are of equal bargaining 
power. The bargaining positions are part of the surrounding circumstances that a 
court will evaluate in determining whether a clause constitutes a penalty. A 
presumption arises that the clause is not a penalty if parties are of equal bargaining 
power583 and had obtained skilled legal advice,584 as determined in Cavendish. If 
the Doctrine excluded commercial transactions made by parties of equal bargaining 
power in receipt of skilled legal advice, an extra expense would be incurred by 
requiring the court to first conclude on these matters.585 This is undesirable and not 
proposed. Considering the relative bargaining power and any receipt of legal advice 
provides valuable indicia, but is not determinative. Inequality of bargaining power 
                                                          
579 Handelsgesetzbuch [Commercial Code] (Germany) (‘HGB’). See §248. 
580 See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [165] (Lord 
Mance JSC).  
581 McDougal J suggests that ‘a less liberal view should be taken to contracts of adhesion, on a ‘take 
it or leave it’ basis, where in reality there is no open and balanced negotiation… Despite the fact 
that one party was a large corporation in this case [Paciocco], the majority thought there was no 
inequality of bargaining power between the parties’: McDougall, above n 540, 11. 
582 A clause may not necessarily be a penalty despite parties having unequal bargaining power, or 
having used a standard form contract; this is why these factors are not determinative. However, these 
factors are relevant and should be considered. 
583 See, eg, Baron, above n 511, 307: ‘agreed sums in contracts between sophisticated commercial 
parties should be slow to attract judicial intervention’.  
584 See, eg, GSA Group v Seibe PLC (1993) 30 NSWLR 573, 579 (Rogers CJ): ‘The courts should 
not be too eager to interfere in the commercial conduct of the parties, especially where all of the 
parties are wealthy, experienced, commercial entities able to attend to their own interests’ quoted in 
Baron, above n 511, 307. 




or lack of legal advice does not necessarily mean that the clause constitutes a 
penalty; which is why these are not determinative factors. This view has also been 
adopted in the United States.586 JKC Holding Co LLC v Washington Sports 
Ventures Inc, 264 F 3d 459 (4th Cir, 2001) provides an example of that,  where the 
‘quality and quantity of lawyers working on its behalf, the sophistication of the 
parties and the parity of their bargaining power’ was considered.587 The court 
concluded that claiming the provision to be ‘illegal and imposed… in terrorem 
[was] unsubstantiated by the evidence and defie[d] common sense’.588 A further 
example is provided by the recent New Zealand decisions, which adopted the 
United Kingdom position in considering bargaining power.  
 
In Torchlight Fund No1 LP (in rec) v Johnstone589 the New Zealand High Court 
adopted the proposition from Cavendish which included ‘an assessment of the 
relationship between the parties… and the bargaining position of the parties’.590 In 
this case,591 one party was ‘sophisticated and experienced in business’592 whilst the 
other received ‘financial and legal advice throughout’.593 The court determined that 
the case was at the ‘opposite end of the factual spectrum to cases with the consumer 
protection flavour of Andrews and Paciocco’594 and that ‘both parties should be free 
to set whatever terms they wished’.595 Although this was a relevant factor, it was 
not determinative as the court held the clause was a penalty based on the 
extravagance of the stipulated sum in comparison with the greatest likely loss.596 In 
the appeal of Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP (in rec),597 the New Zealand 
                                                          
586 See e.g, Posner J in Lake River Corp v Carborundum Co, 769 F 2d 1284 (7th Cir, 1985) cited in 
Baron, above n 511, 307. See also Wallace Real Estate Inc v Groves, 124 Wash 2d 881, 881 P 2d 
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589 [2015] NZHC 2559. 
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591 Although the loan in this case was governed by New South Wales law, the same principles will 
likely apply to those contracts governed by New Zealand law. See discussion: Sean Gollin, Jane 
Standage and Mihai Pascariu, New Zealand Court of Appeal Guidance on Penalty Law (3 May 2017) 
MinterEllisonRuddWatts <https://minterellison.co.nz/our-view/new-zealand-court-of-appeal-
guidance-on-penalty-law>. 
592 Torchlight Fund No1 LP (in rec) v Johnstone [2015] NZHC 2559, [158]. 
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594 Ibid [160]. 
595 Ibid.  
596 Ibid [187]. 
597 [2017] NZCA 152. 
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Court of Appeal confirmed the importance of the parties’ bargaining positions and 
the commercial context of the relevant agreement in concluding that the clause did 
not constitute a penalty:598  
Both parties were substantial commercial entities. Each was economically astute. 
Each was independently advised. The transaction was negotiated over a period of 
weeks. There was no disparity of bargaining power. Compelling reason would be 
needed why ordinary principles of freedom of contract should not apply to such 
parties. 
New Zealand has therefore adopted the United Kingdom approach in considering 
the parties’ bargaining power with respect to penalties. This decision is persuasive. 
The parties’ bargaining positions are not currently considered in Australia when 
construing whether or not a clause constitutes a penalty but is a beneficial reform 
and one that Australian courts should adopt. The author would also recommend, 
prior to implementing any reform, that a report by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission into the benefits and detriments together with recommendations 


















                                                          
598 Ibid [91]. 
599 See also Carter et al, ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction’, above n 
158, 128.  
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VIII CONCLUSION  
The penalty doctrine has a rich history, originating in England from the 13th century 
and slowly developing into a principled area of law by the 20th century. Various 
rules were formulated, including that breach of contract was a necessary element, 
in order that the compensation thus available could fall foul of the Doctrine. If 
compensation was not available or could not be ascertained, equity would not 
intervene to relieve against the penalty. Despite these principles of application, the 
Australian High Court in Andrews held that the Doctrine had always applied in 
instances other than breach of contract. The High Court, in reality, radically 
transformed the Doctrine and the way it has been understood to operate by 
extending the scope of the Doctrine to apply in instances other than breach of 
contract. The decision of Andrews was criticised from various commentators as no 
reason was given for this modification.  
 
Although the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Cavendish criticised the decision 
of Andrews and refused to extend the application of the Doctrine in the United 
Kingdom, the Australian High Court confirmed the decision of Andrews in the 
decision of Paciocco. The High Court thereby confirmed the extended application 
of the Doctrine to instances other than breach of contract. This extended application 
infringes upon freedom of contract and also requires the courts to review the 
fairness of the contractual agreement itself, rather than reviewing the remedies 
available upon breach. This extends the judiciary’s supervisory role into an 
unprecedented area. Although the extended application of the Doctrine prevents 
parties from avoiding the Doctrine’s application through clever drafting, this 
occasional anomaly is justified in order to protect the parties’ rights to contract 
freely.600 Further, although a variety of clauses could now fall within the scope of 
the Doctrine,601 the policy decision of Paciocco appears to demonstrate the Court’s 
reluctance to find that a penalty exists, even though the contract was not freely 
negotiated. 
 
                                                          
600 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (4 November 2015) [43]. 
601 See, eg, Ibid [42] (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord 
Carnwath JSC agreed). 
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As obiter in Paciocco, French CJ suggested that statutory reform may be the 
appropriate way forward,602 even though the High Court had already reformulated 
the Doctrine in Andrews. The efficacy of any statutory reform depends primarily 
on the terms of the proposed legislation. As there is no current draft bill it is difficult 
to come to any conclusions. Other reforms have also been suggested over the years. 
Reform by way of abrogating the Doctrine or subsuming it into the principle of 
unconscionability is rejected as the problems associated with these reforms 
outweigh any potential benefits. The author instead proposes taking into account 
the parties’ bargaining position in accordance with the United Kingdom position, 
which has also recently been implemented in New Zealand. This includes the court 
considering whether a standard form contract was used, whether the parties are 
commercially sophisticated and of equal bargaining power, and whether the parties 
were acting on skilled legal advice. Although relevant to a decision, these factors 
would not be determinative. As these considerations are procedural and not 
substantive, they do not infringe upon freedom of contract or the supervisory role 
of the courts. If these factors were already considered relevant within the Australian 
jurisdiction, Paciocco may have been decided differently.  
 
Although this area of law has created uncertainty in recent years, the Doctrine has 
existed for centuries and should continue to exist as long as it remains useful. The 
Doctrine provides value to the law and to contracting parties. Whether the Doctrine 
will be further reformed in light of the recent uncertainty that has arisen following 
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